United States v. James Wells
879 F.3d 900
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- James Michael Wells was convicted after a jury trial for two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of murder of a federal employee, and two firearm-related counts arising from the April 12, 2012 killings of two Coast Guard coworkers at COMMSTA Kodiak; he was sentenced to multiple life terms and ordered restitution.
- Key evidence included surveillance video (showing a small blue SUV), an unexplained 34-minute gap in Wells’ commute, a voicemail alibi about a flat tire, and forensic testing of a tire and nail recovered from Wells’ truck.
- The Government’s trial theory combined motive (workplace grievances, disciplinary conflicts) with forensic and expert evidence to place Wells at the scene driving his wife’s blue Honda CR‑V.
- The Government presented Dr. J. Reid Meloy, a forensic psychologist, to testify about characteristics of perpetrators of targeted workplace multiple homicide (a criminal “profile”); the Government and closing argument repeatedly urged the jury to ask whether Meloy’s profile “fit” Wells.
- Defense challenges on appeal included removal of second CJA counsel, admission of Dr. Meloy’s profile testimony, admission of various character and other-acts evidence, prosecutorial misconduct during witness examination, exclusion of proposed third‑party culpability evidence, and a request to reassign the case on remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wells) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Removal of second CJA counsel | Removal deprived Wells of continuity and effective representation given FPD resource constraints | §3005 dual appointment not mandatory in non‑capital cases; magistrate properly considered Guide factors | Magistrate’s removal was within discretion, but Government’s intervention in CJA process criticized |
| Admission of criminal‑profile expert (Dr. Meloy) | Profile testimony was improper character evidence and used as substantive evidence of guilt; highly prejudicial under Rules 404(a) and 403 | Expert provided background on workplace violence and should allow jury to assess whether profile fits; not offered as personal opinion about Wells | Admission was reversible error: Meloy’s profile was used substantively to connect circumstantial strands, violating Rule 404(a)(1) and Rule 403 balancing |
| Admission of other‑acts / character evidence | Other‑acts (including a remote 2003 disobedience incident) were irrelevant or impermissible propensity evidence, especially when tied to the profile | Much of the testimony came from personnel records or was background relevant to motive and workplace context | Most challenged other‑acts were admissible under Rule 404(b)(2) as motive/background, but the 2003 incident (too remote, no nexus to victims) was improperly admitted |
| Exclusion of third‑party culpability evidence (Jason Barnum) | Proffered witnesses could show an alternative perpetrator or link to the crime | Proffer lacked any meaningful, reliable, or relevant connection to the victims or facility | District court did not abuse discretion in excluding Barnum evidence as not minimally relevant |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1980) (governs relevancy standard for third‑party culpability evidence)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (expert testimony admissibility and cross‑examination as traditional weapons against weak expert evidence)
- Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) (prosecution may not use defendant’s character in its case‑in‑chief to prove conduct on a particular occasion)
- Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (distinction between reversal for trial error and reversal for evidentiary insufficiency)
- Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) (warning about prejudicial effect of expert testimony given the court’s imprimatur)
- United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1979) (framework for sanctions/balancing when Government’s handling of physical evidence is challenged)