United States v. James Tebeau
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 8818
8th Cir.2013Background
- Tebeau owns Camp Zoe, a 300+ acre Missouri property used for periodic music festivals with widespread reported drug use.
- Undercover officers conducted investigations at Camp Zoe from 2009–2010, resulting in numerous controlled drug purchases and observations of open drug activity.
- Tebeau was indicted for managing a drug-involved premises under 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) after a 2010 search of Camp Zoe.
- Tebeau moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing § 856(a)(2) requires proof of his specific illegal intent; the district court denied this.
- Tebeau pled guilty with a reservation to appeal the denial, and the district court sentenced him; on appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 856(a)(2) require specific intent to illegal use on the property? | Tebeau argues § 856(a)(2) requires intent to use/store/distribute drugs on his property. | Court should read § 856(a)(2) to punish making property available, not require his own illegal purpose. | No; § 856(a)(2) does not require Tebeau's own illegal intent. |
| Is the indictment sufficient under Rule 7(c) after adopting the § 856(a)(2) interpretation? | Indictment must allege operative facts showing his knowledge and intent to make property available for illegal use. | Indictment tracks the statutory language and adequately apprises him of the charge. | Indictment sufficiently states the offense under Rule 7(c). |
| Is § 856(a)(2) vague under the Fifth Amendment as applied to this case? | A broad interpretation could permit arbitrary enforcement and chilling effect on events like concerts. | Statute provides fair notice that knowingly making premises available for drug activity is illegal; not vague as applied. | Not unconstitutionally vague as applied; provides fair notice and limits arbitrary enforcement. |
| Does § 856(a)(2) violate the First Amendment as applied to festival organizers under O'Brien? | § 856(a)(2) satisfies O'Brien; incidental restriction on speech is permissible and not overly burdensome. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1990) (court allowed § 856(a)(2) liability without showing owner’s own illegal purpose)
- United States v. Tamez, 941 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1991) (§ 856(a)(2) does not require the defendant’s illegal purpose)
- United States v. Wilson, 503 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2007) (supports reading § 856(a)(2) to punish making property available for illicit use)
- United States v. Bilis, 170 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 1999) (similar interpretation of § 856(a)(2))
- Banks v. United States, 987 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1993) (conforms to § 856(a)(2) not requiring owner’s illegal purpose)
- United States v. Harrison, 133 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 1998) (jury instructions allowed knowledge/intent to make property available)
- Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999) (textual analysis of statutory meaning in § 856(a)(2))
- Debrow v. United States, 346 U.S. 374 (1953) (indictment sufficiency standard; tracks statutory language)
- Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (O'Brien incidental restriction test)
- Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (notice/definition guidance in due process)