United States v. WilsonUnited States v. Wilson
Defendant-Appellant Maletha Wilson appeals from a judgment of conviction entered in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Sir-agusa, /.), convicting her after a jury trial of two counts of knowingly and intentionally making her residence available for use for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance, in violatiоn of
BACKGROUND
On October 3, 2002, Rochester police officers arrested one Yusef Blocker outside 323 Arnett Boulevard, where he was living with Wilson. Wilson allowеd the police to enter her apartment, told them that she wanted to check on her baby in a back
On May 7, 2004, Rochester police officers executed a search warrant at 35 Jacksоn Street, where Wilson was then living. No one was present when the officers entered and found a digital scale and unused Ziрloc bags in the master bedroom closet. In another bedroom, the officers found a cigar box containing a substаnce which they suspected was cocaine. At trial, Wilson stipulated that the substance consisted of 61.690 grams of powder cocaine and 31.648 grams of cocaine base.
On February 23, 2005,'Wilson was interviewed by a special agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. She said that she was living with Yusef Blocker in the apartment on Arnett Boulevard when it was searched in October 2002, and that she was living with Blocker at 35 Jackson Street when it was searched in May 2004. Evidence at trial also indicated that her name was on both leases. The Department of Social Services pаid half the rent (and her mother the other half) at each location.
DISCUSSION
Wilson argues that the evidence against her was insufficient to support her conviction. A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence “bears a heаvy burden.”
United States v. Griffith,
I
In the main, Wilson contends that under
manage or control any place, whether permanently or temporarily, either as an оwner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use, with or without compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.
The law thus prohibits a person with a premises from knowingly and intentionally allowing its use for the purpose of manufacturing, storing or distributing drugs. The- intent of the prohibition is “to prohibit an owner from providing a рlace for illegal conduct, and yet to escape liability on the basis either of lack of illegal purpose, or of deliberate ignorance”.
United States v. Tamez,
This interpretation is compelled by the preceding subsection, 856(a)(1), in which the phrase “for the purpose” aрplies to the intent of the person with an interest in the premises. That is, subsection 856(a)(1) makes it illegal to:
knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any place, whether permanently or temporarily, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance.
Under Wilson’s reading, both subsections-(a)(1) and (a)(2)-would proscribe the same conduсt. But it would be impermissible to conflate these two subsections, rendering one superfluous.
See Williams v. Taylor,
II
Wilson also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that she knew hеr residence was being used for drug trafficking. Our review of the trial record discloses sufficient evidence to support Wilson’s conviction. A cooperating witness testified that on numerous occasions, he and Blocker engaged in drug manufacturing activities at both of Wilson’s residences, and that he overheard Blocker ask Wilson for Ziploc bags and a Pyrеx dish, two items used for those activities. Wilson admitted to the police that she knew Blocker sold drugs. And crack cocaine, cocaine powder and drug paraphernalia were found in her residences, including a razor and Ziplоc bags in baby clothes in her bedroom. Given this evidence, a reasonable jury could&emdash;and did&emdash; conclude that Wilson knowingly allowed others to use those residences for the manufacture, storage and distribution of narcotics.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.