United States v. James Misleveck
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23690
| 7th Cir. | 2013Background
- Defendant Misleveck pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- District court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), finding three prior felony convictions for "violent felonies," and imposed a 15-year mandatory minimum.
- One prior conviction was under Wisconsin's arson-of-property statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.03 (arson of property other than a building), which criminalizes intentional damage by fire to non-building property valued at $100 or more.
- Central legal question: whether a conviction under Wis. Stat. § 943.03 counts as "arson" (a listed "violent felony") for purposes of the ACCA.
- Court evaluated the statute against the ACCA's definition of "violent felony," relevant Supreme Court precedent on "generic" offenses (Taylor, Shepard, Descamps, Begay), and comparisons to the federal arson statute and other states' arson laws.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wis. Stat. § 943.03 qualifies as "arson" under the ACCA | § 943.03 criminalizes intentional burning of another's property valued ≥ $100 and therefore fits ACCA's enumerated offense of arson | § 943.03 covers trivial/non-building property (e.g., a $125 hat); the low $100 threshold and coverage of "intentional" (not strictly "purposeful") conduct mean it is broader than "generic" arson and should not trigger ACCA | The statute qualifies: generic arson includes intentional/malicious burning of property (not limited to buildings); Wisconsin's elements align with federal generic arson and ACCA application |
Key Cases Cited
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (interpreting use of statutory elements in ACCA analysis)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (holding courts must look to the statutory elements and certain documents to determine prior conviction categorization)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishing the "generic" offense approach for ACCA enumerated crimes)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (discussing characteristics of enumerated offenses and use of Model Penal Code language)
- Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir.) (distinguishing Delaware arson statutes; discussed in relation to intent/recklessness)
- United States v. McBride, 724 F.3d 754 (7th Cir.) (defining "maliciously" for federal arson statute)
- United States v. Velez-Alderete, 569 F.3d 541 (5th Cir.) (treating arson of personal property as generic arson)
- United States v. Whaley, 552 F.3d 904 (8th Cir.) (similar holding on scope of generic arson)
- United States v. Velasquez-Reyes, 427 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir.) (treating non-building arson as within generic arson)
- United States v. Howze, 343 F.3d 919 (7th Cir.) (on using statute elements rather than particular conduct)