United States v. James Johnman, Jr., 948 F.3d 612

Defendant Johnman pled guilty to three child-exploitation offenses (18 U.S.C. §§ 2422(b), 2252(a)(2), 2252(a)(4)).
The plea agreement and the District Court each treated the JVTA assessment as $5,000 per qualifying count and reflected a $15,000 JVTA assessment (plus $300 under § 3013), for $15,300 total; Johnman raised no district-court objections.
Judgment imposed 368 months’ imprisonment, lifetime supervised release, $1,000 restitution, and $15,300 in special assessments; Johnman appealed.
The government sought to enforce the appellate-waiver; the panel nevertheless directed briefing on whether the JVTA § 3014 assessment is per conviction or per case.
The Third Circuit reviewed for plain error (Johnman did not object below) but found no error: it interpreted § 3014’s text and related precedent to require $5,000 for each qualifying conviction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does 18 U.S.C. § 3014 require one $5,000 assessment per case or per qualifying conviction?	Johnman: JVTA imposes a single assessment per case (not per count).	Government: § 3014’s text and settled interpretation of § 3013 mean $5,000 applies to each qualifying conviction.	Per conviction — $5,000 for each qualifying count (affirmed).
Does the plea waiver bar review of the assessment?	Johnman: raised statutory-interpretation challenge on appeal.	Government: waiver should foreclose appeal except for illegal sentence.	Waiver did not bar review because parties cannot consent to an illegal sentence; Court addressed the statutory question.
Is the rule of lenity applicable to construe § 3014 in defendant’s favor?	Johnman: ambiguity triggers lenity.	Government: statute is clear; lenity requires grievous ambiguity after traditional tools.	Lenity inapplicable — statute unambiguous after ordinary tools of interpretation.

United States v. Donaldson, 797 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (held § 3013 assessment applies per count of conviction)
Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (1996) (interpreting § 3013 as imposing a special assessment for every count)
United States v. Luongo, 11 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1993) (explained singular phrasing implies per-offense assessment)
Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369 (2013) (start statutory interpretation with text and ordinary meaning)
Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018) (use ordinary meaning of statutory words at enactment)
Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S. Ct. 1752 (2018) (presume Congress adopts settled judicial interpretations when repeating language)