United States v. James Hobgood
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15928
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- Hobgood had a brief romantic relationship with KB in Virginia; she moved to Arkansas after rebuffing him.
- Hobgood repeatedly contacted KB, her family, and her employer by e-mail, social media, telephone, and mail, demanding an in-person apology and threatening to portray KB as an exotic dancer and prostitute.
- Hobgood created publicly accessible social-media accounts and sent communications alleging KB was an exotic dancer/prostitute; KB suffered emotional distress and short-term hospitalization.
- Law enforcement corroborated Hobgood’s role; he admitted he would not stop until she lost her job or "repented." A grand jury charged him with interstate stalking under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2).
- Hobgood conditionally pleaded guilty, preserved appeal of the district court’s denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds; he was sentenced to 12 months + 1 day and ordered to pay $2,387.91 in restitution.
Issues
| Issue | Hobgood's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether applying § 2261A(2) to Hobgood’s communications violates the First Amendment as an impermissible content-based restriction | His communications were protected speech; conviction for that speech infringes First Amendment rights | The communications were "speech integral to criminal conduct" because they were extortionate; such speech is unprotected | Court affirmed: speech was integral to extortion and therefore unprotected; § 2261A(2) constitutional as applied |
| Whether Hobgood’s communications constituted extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 875(d) (relevant to protection analysis) | An apology cannot be a "thing of value" and he believed he had a legitimate claim to an apology, so no extortion | A "thing of value" can be intangible; Hobgood subjectively valued the apology and his threats lacked a causal nexus to any legitimate claim, satisfying extortion elements | Court held apology could be a thing of value and threats were wrongful (no claim of right), so conduct could be viewed as extortion |
| Whether restitution for moving expenses was properly awarded | Moving within same complex was not clearly proximately caused by Hobgood’s offense | Victim’s statement that she was frightened and implied she changed addresses to avoid Hobgood supported causation | Court held government proved proximate causation by preponderance; restitution affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (court upheld restrictions on speech integral to criminal conduct)
- United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (content-based restrictions disfavored but narrow categories of unprotected speech exist)
- United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2012) (extortionate communications threatening reputation are unprotected)
- United States v. Jackson, 180 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1999) (wrongfulness for extortion requires causal nexus to claim of right)
- United States v. Hutson, 843 F.2d 1232 (9th Cir. 1988) (extortionate speech is not protected)
- United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1975) (extortionate communications are unprotected)