United States v. Jamar Quarles, 850 F.3d 836

Jamar Quarles pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)).
At original sentencing the district court applied the ACCA’s residual clause based on a Michigan third-degree home invasion conviction; sentence (204 months) was vacated on appeal after Johnson and case remanded for resentencing.
On remand the district court held Michigan third-degree home invasion is the functional equivalent of generic burglary and again sentenced Quarles to 204 months.
Michigan’s third-degree home invasion statute (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.110a(4)) criminalizes various entries into a “dwelling” with intent to commit a misdemeanor or committing a misdemeanor while entering, present in, or exiting.
Quarles challenged that the Michigan statute is overbroad because (1) its definition of “dwelling” and (2) its alternative theory (commission of a misdemeanor while entering/inside/exiting) allow convictions that fall outside the generic burglary definition.
The Sixth Circuit reviews de novo whether a prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA violent felony using the categorical approach (compare statutory elements to the generic offense).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Michigan’s definition of “dwelling” is broader than the generic burglary protected class	Quarles: “dwelling”/“shelter” could cover non-structures (trees, vehicles, tarps), making the statute overbroad	Govt/History: Michigan limits “shelter” to places used as an abode; legislature expressly listed non-building locations elsewhere, so realistic probability of overbreadth is lacking	Court: Rejected Quarles’ argument; “dwelling” as defined is not broader than Taylor’s “building or other structure”
Whether statute lacks required intent-at-entry element for generic burglary	Quarles: statute’s alternative (commit misdemeanor while entering/present/exiting) permits post-entry intent, so it is not generic burglary	Govt: Under Taylor’s “entry into, or remaining in,” intent may develop while remaining inside; Sixth Circuit precedent supports this reading	Court: Rejected Quarles’ argument; generic burglary does not require intent at the moment of entry — intent can be formed while remaining in

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (defines generic burglary as unlawful entry or remaining in a building or structure with intent to commit a crime)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (categorical approach: compare statutory elements to generic offense)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (invalidated ACCA residual clause; prompted resentencing/remand)
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (requires realistic probability, not hypothetical possibility, to show state statute covers conduct outside generic crime)
United States v. Gibbs, 626 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. holding that Michigan home-invasion variants are equivalent to burglary of a dwelling)
United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676 (6th Cir. holding that a ‘remaining-in’ burglary variant qualifies as generic burglary)
United States v. Ritchey, 840 F.3d 310 (distinguishes statutes that explicitly list non-structure locations as broader than generic burglary)
United States v. Mitchell, 743 F.3d 1054 (6th Cir. de novo review framework for ACCA predicate determinations)