United States v. Jamaal Evans
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1859
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- In July 2013, Jamaal Evans brandished a gun, ordered the driver Amani Duke out of his car, attempted to take Duke’s wallet, shot Duke in both legs, and fled in the vehicle. Duke required emergency treatment.
- A federal grand jury charged Evans with carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury (18 U.S.C. § 2119(2)) and using/discharging a firearm in relation to a carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)), plus Hobbs Act robbery counts and related § 924(c) counts; some counts were later dismissed as part of a plea.
- Evans moved to dismiss the § 924(c) counts, arguing neither the Hobbs Act robbery nor the federal carjacking statute qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3).
- The district court denied the motion; Evans pleaded guilty to one Hobbs Act robbery count, one carjacking count, and one § 924(c) discharge count, preserving the right to appeal the § 924(c) issue.
- The court sentenced Evans to concurrent terms for robbery and carjacking and a consecutive 120-month § 924(c) term; Evans appealed only the § 924(c) conviction/sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119) is a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A) (force clause) | Evans: “Intimidation” in § 2119 can mean putting someone in fear via non-violent threats (e.g., poisoning), so the statute does not necessarily require threatened or violent physical force and therefore is not categorically a crime of violence. | Government: “Intimidation” in the phrase “by force and violence or by intimidation” necessarily connotes a threat to use violent physical force; thus § 2119 meets the force-clause definition. | The Fourth Circuit affirmed: § 2119’s “intimidation” element necessarily requires threatened use of violent physical force, so carjacking is categorically a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. McNeal, 818 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2016) (interpreting “intimidation” in a substantively identical federal statute to require threatened violent physical force)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defining “violent force” as force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (elements-based categorical approach for statute comparisons)
- United States v. Moore, 43 F.3d 568 (11th Cir. 1994) (carjacking is always a crime of violence)
- United States v. Mohammed, 27 F.3d 815 (2d Cir. 1994) (carjacking qualifies as a crime of violence)