United States v. Jackson, 622 F.Supp.3d 1063

Defendant Barry B. Jackson, Jr. indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) for possessing two firearms after a misdemeanor domestic-violence conviction; he moved to declare § 922(g)(9) facially unconstitutional and to dismiss the indictment.
Government opposed, citing pre-Bruen Tenth Circuit precedent upholding § 922(g) and arguing Bruen did not undermine those prohibitions; it analogized § 922(g)(9) to historical felon-disarmament rules and other long-standing restrictions.
Supreme Court decisions Heller and McDonald recognize an individual, home-centered right to bear arms and make that right applicable against the states; Bruen rejected means-end scrutiny and mandated a historical-tradition test for firearm regulations.
The district court concluded Bruen is an intervening Supreme Court decision that changes the analytical framework previously applied by the Tenth Circuit, requiring historical-analogue review of § 922(g)(9).
The court found the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct at issue (possession for self-defense) and that the government’s historical-analogy arguments—primarily to felon-disarmament and similar historical restrictions—were sufficient under Bruen to justify § 922(g)(9).
The court therefore denied the motion, holding § 922(g)(9) is not facially unconstitutional and preserving the question for appellate review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Bruen displaced binding Tenth Circuit precedent	Bruen did not negate longstanding precedents upholding § 922(g)	Bruen is an intervening decision that requires reexamination of circuit precedent	Bruen is an intervening decision and controls the analytical framework
Whether the Second Amendment covers possession by a misdemeanor domestic-violence offender	§922(g)(9) targets disfavored status; Heller dicta preserves prohibitions on certain classes	Second Amendment protections turn on conduct (possession for self-defense), not status, so the text covers defendant’s conduct	Textual coverage exists: possession for self-defense is covered by the Second Amendment
Whether § 922(g)(9) is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation	Historical analogies to felon-disarmament and surety-like restrictions justify the modern prohibition	Historical record is thin for domestic-violence-specific disarmament; prohibition of misdemeanants is not clearly analogous	Government met its burden by relying on historical analogies, particularly to felon disarmament and similar long-standing limits
Whether the indictment must be dismissed as facially defective	Dismissal is appropriate if the statute is facially unconstitutional	Statute is facially constitutional under Bruen’s test	Motion to dismiss denied; indictment not facially defective

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizes an individual right to possess handguns for self-defense in the home)
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporates the Second Amendment against the states)
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) (rejects means-end scrutiny and requires historical-tradition test for firearm regulations)
Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686 (2016) (interprets § 922(g)(9) to cover certain reckless-misdemeanor convictions)
United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010) (upheld § 922(g) under pre-Bruen analysis)
United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2012) (upheld § 922(g) applications in the Tenth Circuit)
United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 2009) (discussed Heller dictum and its relation to § 922(g))
United States v. Doe, 865 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2017) (explains when a Supreme Court intervening decision displaces circuit precedent)