828 F.3d 1018
9th Cir.2016Background
- Ornelas pled guilty to a methamphetamine-distribution count and admitted a prior conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 851, agreeing to an appeal waiver unless the sentence exceeded the Guidelines high end.
- While released on bond and awaiting sentencing, agents found methamphetamine at his residence; he missed required pretrial contacts and stopped living at his surety’s home.
- A warrant issued for bond violations; Ornelas did not appear at a scheduled bond-revocation hearing or at the sentencing hearing three months after pleading guilty.
- At sentencing, defense counsel objected to proceeding in Ornelas’s absence (citing Rule 43, Rule 32, and due process) and noted counsel had not discussed the presentence report with Ornelas.
- The district court found Ornelas had voluntarily absented himself, sentenced him in absentia to the 120-month statutory mandatory minimum, and stated it would have imposed the same term regardless.
- On appeal Ornelas challenged the in-absentia sentencing under Rule 43, Rule 32, and the Due Process Clause; the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the sentence was unlawful and whether the appeal waiver applied.
Issues
| Issue | Ornelas’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether sentencing in absentia violated Rule 43 | Absentia violated Rule 43 because absence prevented counsel’s consultation and presentence-report review | Rule 43 permits sentencing when defendant voluntarily absents himself; court found voluntary absence | Court: No abuse of discretion; defendant voluntarily absent, so Rule 43 not violated |
| Whether sentencing in absentia violated Due Process | Due process protections are at least coextensive with Rule 43; Ornelas’s substance-use/mental issues made absence plausibly involuntary | Due process offers no greater protection than Rule 43; record shows voluntary absence and no evidence of involuntariness | Court: No constitutional violation; due process coextensive with Rule 43 here |
| Whether Rule 32 was violated by sentencing before counsel discussed the PSR with defendant | Rule 32(i)(1)(A) requires verification that defendant and counsel have read and discussed PSR; absent discussion made sentencing unlawful | Waiver of presence by voluntary absence includes waiver of Rule 32 procedural benefit when defendant fled or voluntarily absented himself | Court: No error; voluntary absence waives Rule 32 objection in this context |
| Whether the appeal waiver should be enforced despite these claims | Waiver in plea agreement is valid but exceptions exist for unlawful or unconstitutional sentences | Appeal waiver covers this sentence; if sentence lawful, waiver bars appeal | Court: Sentence lawful; appeal waiver enforced; appeal dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (U.S. 1970) (constitutional right to be present at trial stages)
- Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255 (U.S. 1993) (Rule 43 permits proceeding if defendant voluntarily absent)
- United States v. Bibler, 495 F.3d 621 (9th Cir. 2007) (enforcing appeal waivers barring collateral claims except unlawful sentences)
- United States v. Marotta, 518 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1975) (trial-in-absentia reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- United States v. Houtchens, 926 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1991) (factual voluntariness finding reviewed for clear error)
- United States v. Achbani, 507 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2007) (district court must explore on-record serious questions about voluntariness)
- United States v. Jordan, 216 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2000) (voluntary absence waives certain PSR review rights under Rule 32)
- United States v. Alessandrello, 637 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rule 43 broader than constitutional right to presence)
- United States v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Rule 43 embodies Sixth Amendment, Due Process, and common-law presence rights)
