United States v. Huart, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23581

Huart, serving a federal sentence for child pornography, was transferred to Rock Valley Community Program, a BOP-contracted halfway house, in May 2011.
On arrival he signed conditions acknowledging he remained in federal custody and was subject to facility rules and searches; Rock Valley’s rules prohibited cell phones and allowed staff to search or confiscate contraband and to view phone contents.
On August 19, 2011, staff found an LG cell phone on Huart’s bed during a random room search; the assistant director viewed images on the phone and discovered numerous files that appeared to be child pornography.
Huart admitted possession; the phone was turned over to the FBI on October 13, 2011; agents later obtained a warrant but could not immediately bypass the phone’s passcode and unlocked it months later.
Huart moved to suppress the images arguing (1) he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone and contents while in the halfway house and (2) the FBI’s delayed cracking of the passcode rendered the search effectively warrantless; the district court denied suppression and Huart reserved the suppression appeal after pleading guilty.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Huart had a Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy in a cell phone kept at a BOP-contracted halfway house	Huart: Halfway house is less restrictive than prison; he retained some liberty and thus a limited, societally recognized expectation of privacy	Government: Huart signed custody/condition forms; Rock Valley rules made phones contraband and expressly authorized searches/viewing of phone contents, so no reasonable expectation	Court: No reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone or contents while at the halfway house
Whether the later FBI decryption/search after the warrant’s expiration made the search unlawful	Huart: FBI failed to search before warrant’s stated expiration, so subsequent access was warrantless	Government: Because no Fourth Amendment expectation existed in the halfway house context, no warrant was required; alternatively, seizure occurred when staff took the phone and later analysis is permitted	Court: Declined to reach this issue because it held no expectation of privacy existed; noted Rule 41(e)(2)(B) supports later electronic analysis of seized devices

United States v. Jackson, 598 F.3d 340 (7th Cir. 2010) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
United States v. Yang, 478 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2007) (two-part test for expectation of privacy)
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (prisoners lack Fourth Amendment privacy in cells)
Peckham v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 141 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 1998) (Hudson’s effect on prisoner search protections)
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (searches of probationers and balancing of governmental interests)
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (probationer search principles)
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (parole is an established variation on imprisonment; suspicionless searches can be reasonable)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole/probation as a form of continued custody)
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (governmental handling of seized private property does not always implicate Fourth Amendment)
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (trespass test for searches; court here observed even if Jones applied it would only establish a search occurred, not that it was unreasonable)