United States v. Houston
857 F.3d 427
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- Minor A (13) contacted Calhoun via Facebook and misrepresented her age; Calhoun arranged travel and prostitution activities and coached Minor A on posting ads on Backpage.com.
- Houston agreed to drive Calhoun and Minor A from Maine to Boston and back; he transported Minor A to locations to meet clients, received expense payments, and learned Minor A's true age during the trip.
- FBI identified Minor A; on return to Maine the group met an undercover detective and Calhoun and Houston were arrested; Houston made post-arrest statements and later executed a proffer agreement whose terms limited government use of his proffer statements but allowed the government to provide those statements to the court.
- Both defendants pleaded guilty to transporting a minor with intent that she engage in prostitution, 18 U.S.C. § 2421; PSRs applied enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3 for undue influence and computer use, and reductions for acceptance of responsibility, yielding Guidelines ranges of 87–108 months.
- District court overruled Houston’s objections, applied the undue-influence and computer-use enhancements to both defendants, and sentenced each to 108 months imprisonment.
- On appeal, Houston challenged the undue-influence and computer-use enhancements and claimed the government breached the proffer agreement; Calhoun challenged the district court’s consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and the substantive reasonableness of her sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Application of § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) undue-influence enhancement to Houston | Gov: Calhoun’s undue influence is attributable to Houston as relevant conduct and Houston actively participated | Houston: Court improperly attributed Calhoun’s manipulation to him without individualized scope finding; he did not personally unduly influence Minor A | Affirmed: court properly found Calhoun’s post‑joining conduct within the scope of jointly undertaken activity; Houston also failed to rebut the ten‑year age presumption and his conduct independently supported the enhancement |
| Application of § 2G1.3(b)(3) computer-use enhancement | Gov: phones were used to solicit customers for Minor A and constitute use of a computer under (b)(3)(B) | Houston: Application Note 4 limits enhancement to direct communications with a minor or guardian, so it shouldn’t apply to solicitation of third parties | Affirmed: Court (joining several circuits) held Application Note 4 is inconsistent with plain text of (b)(3)(B); enhancement applies to solicitation of third parties via computer |
| Breach of proffer agreement by government using Houston’s proffer statements at sentencing | Houston: government referenced his proffer statements in its sentencing memorandum, breaching promise not to use statements at sentencing | Gov: sentencing memo relied on post‑arrest interview statements, not proffer; government provided proffer to court per agreement; court independently used proffer to rebut Houston | No breach: government did not improperly introduce proffer statements; proffer was provided to court under agreement and court’s sua sponte reliance does not show government breach |
| Adequacy of district court’s consideration of § 3553(a) and substantive reasonableness (Calhoun) | Calhoun: court overemphasized offense seriousness/deterrence and downplayed mitigating personal history | Gov: court considered § 3553(a), addressed offense and mitigating history, and imposed within‑Guidelines sentence | Affirmed: district court expressly considered § 3553(a), reasonably weighed factors, and the within‑Guidelines 108‑month sentence was procedurally and substantively permissible |
Key Cases Cited
- Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (Guidelines commentary is authoritative unless contrary to statute, Constitution, or plainly erroneous reading of guideline)
- United States v. Pringler, 765 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2014) (interpreting § 2G1.3(b)(3) and concluding application note drafting error rendered note inapplicable to subsection (B))
- United States v. Cramer, 777 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding application note 4 inconsistent with plain text of § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B))
- United States v. Leahy, 668 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2012) (standards for appellate review of Guidelines issues after plea)
- United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223 (1st Cir. 2015) (plain‑error review framework for unpreserved sentencing objections)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (sentencing review standards; district court must consider § 3553(a) factors)
- United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588 (1st Cir. 2011) (a statement that court considered § 3553(a) factors carries weight; within‑Guidelines sentences require less explanation)
- United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (reasonableness of sentence depends on plausible rationale and defensible result)