United States v. Hood
920 F.3d 87
1st Cir.2019Background
- HSI received tips that a Kik user "rustyhood" exchanged and posted child pornography; Kik provided account registration data and recent IP logs via an Emergency Disclosure Request under the Stored Communications Act.
- Agent Fife traced the IPs to Metrocast and Fairpoint via administrative summonses, which identified an Oakwood Inn and a Sanford residence; independent searches linked the Kik account and Facebook profile to Rusty Hood.
- Hood was arrested and indicted for transporting and receiving child pornography; he moved to suppress the information obtained from Kik, Metrocast, and Fairpoint as warrantless searches violating the Fourth Amendment.
- The district court denied suppression, Hood pleaded guilty to transporting child pornography while reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling, and was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment plus 10 years’ supervised release.
- The PSR imposed periodic polygraph testing as a supervised-release condition; Hood objected on Fifth Amendment grounds. He appealed both the denial of suppression and the polygraph condition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the warrantless acquisition from Kik of account IP-address logs and associated dates/times violated the Fourth Amendment | Government: third-party doctrine permits warrantless acquisition because Hood voluntarily disclosed information to Kik | Hood: Carpenter requires a warrant for location-related digital data; IP logs reveal precise location and timing similar to CSLI | Court: Held no reasonable expectation of privacy in Kik IP logs; Carpenter is distinguishable because IP logs are user‑triggered strings, not continuous CSLI surveillance; suppression denied |
| Whether a supervised-release condition requiring periodic polygraph exams violates the Fifth Amendment | Hood: Condition compels self-incrimination—must not be forced to answer polygraph or face revocation | Government: Limiting language prevents using refusal or failure alone as basis for revocation; York permits such a condition if construed protectively | Court: Upheld condition as construed to protect Fifth Amendment rights (like York); as-applied Miranda/mental‑capacity challenge not ripe |
Key Cases Cited
- Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (CSLI acquisition from carrier requires a warrant)
- Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (third-party doctrine: no expectation of privacy in information voluntarily given to third parties)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Fourth Amendment protects reasonable expectations of privacy)
- United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (no warrant required for surreptitiously recorded conversations turned over to third parties)
- United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no expectation of privacy in bank records held by bank)
- Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) (Fifth Amendment privilege applies to official questioning where answers may incriminate)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation requires warnings)
- United States v. York, 357 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding polygraph condition when construed to protect the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights)
- United States v. Contreras, 905 F.3d 853 (5th Cir. 2018) (post‑Carpenter circuit decision treating IP/log data distinct from CSLI)