United States v. Hood, 774 F.3d 638

Background

On March 14, 2012, Oklahoma City officers investigating burglaries went to an apartment complex where residents reported someone running from apartment 108.
Officers encountered Michael Hood wearing a heavy jacket on a warm day, facing a corner and making frantic motions as if fumbling in his jacket; officers drew weapons, ordered him to the ground, handcuffed and frisked him, and seized a 9mm pistol from his jacket pocket.
A grand jury indicted Hood on two counts of being a felon in possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1): Count One (the March 14 firearm) and Count Two (an unrelated June 6 incident involving ammunition).
The district court denied Hood’s motion to suppress the March 14 firearm and admitted evidence about the burglary investigation as intrinsic evidence; a jury convicted Hood on both counts.
At sentencing the court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on Hood’s prior convictions, including a 1985 Oklahoma conviction for pointing a firearm, producing a Guidelines range of 262–327 months and a 262-month sentence; Hood appealed.

Issues

Issue	Hood's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
1) Whether government waived argument that weapons/handcuffs were reasonable during the stop	Government waived because it did not argue justification for drawing weapons/handcuffing below	Government argued the stop was a justified Terry stop, which necessarily included reasonableness of force, so no waiver	No waiver; government preserved the Terry-stop justification and scope-of-stop arguments
2) Whether officers’ drawing firearms, ordering Hood down, and handcuffing/frisk elevated the stop to an arrest violating the Fourth Amendment	Officers lacked individualized suspicion Hood was dangerous; force transformed seizure into arrest	Officers reasonably drew weapons and handcuffed/frisked to protect safety given burglary investigation, high-crime area, furtive movements, heavy jacket, partial noncompliance	Use of force was reasonable under Terry and did not convert the seizure into an arrest; firearm seizure admissible
3) Whether evidence about the burglary investigation was inadmissible under Rule 404(b)	Evidence was propensity evidence and unfairly prejudicial; should be excluded	Evidence was intrinsic (inextricably intertwined) and explained why officers were present and on heightened alert; not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403	Admission was not an abuse of discretion; evidence was intrinsic and probative outweighing any prejudice
4) Whether Hood’s 1985 Oklahoma conviction for pointing a firearm qualifies as a "violent felony" under the ACCA	Pointing a firearm conviction does not necessarily require threatened violent force and thus should not count	The information shows Hood pointed a gun for purpose of threatening/intimidating—this necessarily involves threatened violent force, so it qualifies	Conviction qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA; ACCA enhancement and sentence affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Gallegos v. City of Colo. Springs, 114 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir.) (framework for assessing Terry-stop inception and scope)
Mosley, 743 F.3d 1317 (10th Cir.) (permitting force during Terry stop to protect officer safety and maintain status quo)
Novitsky v. City of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir.) (objective reasonableness standard for force during investigative stops)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (split-second judgment/objective reasonableness standard for use of force)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defines "physical force" for ACCA as violent force capable of causing pain or injury)
United States v. Ramon Silva, 608 F.3d 663 (10th Cir.) (use of modified categorical approach to determine whether a prior conviction is a violent felony)
United States v. Herron, 432 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir.) (threatening someone with a deadly weapon constitutes threatening violent force for ACCA purposes)
United States v. Briggs, 720 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir.) (furtive hand movements can support a reasonable belief a person is armed)