United States v. Hill, 649 F.3d 258

Hill resided at the Lorton townhouse with Alvarez and their child; police obtained an arrest warrant for Hill with the address listed as unknown.
Alvarez called 911 on July 17, 2009, describing an argument with Hill; she later told officers Hill’s residence included the Lorton townhouse.
Police arrived July 29, 2009 at the Lorton townhouse, knocked, heard noises, and entered without a warrant after finding the door frame damaged and Hill inside with a friend.
A protective sweep found marijuana, a grinder, a gun-related item, scales, ammunition, and other contraband; Alvarez later consented to a search.
Hill was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; Hill entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling.
The district court denied Hill’s suppression motion; on appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded for further factual development on dissipation of taint; the majority concluded the initial entry was unlawful but Alvarez’s consent valid, with taint to be addressed on remand.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the initial entry was justified under Payton.	Hill contends Payton requires a valid basis to believe Hill was inside.	Government contends there were objective facts supporting entry.	Entry not justified under Payton.
Whether exigent circumstances justified the initial entry.	Hill argues there were no exigent circumstances.	Government asserts exigency based on perceived immediacy of danger.	Exigency not established.
Whether Alvarez’s later consent to search was valid.	Consents obtained after an unlawful entry are suspect.	Consent was voluntary as found by the district court.	Consent valid; taint to be evaluated on remand.
Whether taint from the initial illegal entry was dissipated by Alvarez’s consent.	TaP dissipating taint requires independent intervening factors.	Consent could dissipate taint under Brown v. Illinois factors.	Remand for factual development on taint dissipation.

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (Supreme Court, 1980) (entry to arrest warrant requires reasonable belief subject is within)
United States v. Moss, 963 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1992) (exigent circumstances require substantial evidence of emergency)
United States v. Lloyd, 396 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 2005) (noise inside alone not sufficient for dwelling entry)
Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 1999) (presence of lights/other factors can support presence)
Seidman v. United States, 156 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 1998) (taint dissipated where intervening circumstances shown; burden on government)
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 563 (Supreme Court, 1975) (three-factor Brown test for dissipation of taint)