587 F. App'x 878
6th Cir.2014Background
- Patterson and Majors were convicted of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute large quantities of cocaine based on a multi‑state trafficking investigation (Tennessee–California). Searches at 2211 Ladd Drive and 1869 West Court yielded cash, a kilogram of cocaine, vehicles, and other evidence.
- Patterson sought suppression of evidence from the Ladd Drive search; the district court denied suppression, finding officers relied in good faith on a warrant.
- The government severed Patterson’s additional substantive counts (Counts 2–5) from the conspiracy count to avoid prejudice; evidence from the West Court search was nevertheless admitted at the conspiracy trial.
- During voir dire a prospective juror disclosed a marshal acquaintance; the judge held an on‑the‑record, ex parte colloquy with jurors about security (transcripted and provided to counsel).
- After deadlocked deliberations and an Allen charge, jurors reported that Juror LeClair had failed to disclose during voir dire prior experience/associations involving drugs; the court interviewed jurors, removed LeClair, and replaced her with an alternate; the jury later returned guilty verdicts.
- Patterson received a mandatory life minimum due to a statutory recidivism enhancement; Majors was sentenced to 360 months (bottom of Guidelines range). Appeals raised suppression, ex parte communication, admission/double jeopardy, jury instruction, juror removal, sufficiency, and sentencing challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Patterson's Argument | Majors' / Government's Position | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of Ladd Drive search / suppression (good‑faith exception) | Warrant affidavit contained discrepancies and insufficient corroboration; issuing judge was a "rubber stamp." | Affidavit plus surveillance and oral supplement (wiretap info) provided enough corroboration; officers relied objectively in good faith. | Denial of suppression affirmed under Leon (good‑faith exception); no showing of reckless falsehood or rubber‑stamp issuance. |
| Ex parte on‑record colloquy with jurors about security | Defendants: exclusion from security colloquy violated due process and Rule 43. | Government: colloquy was minor, on the record, and served to allay safety concerns; transcripts provided. | No reversible error; Gagnon controls—defendants’ presence not required and any Rule 43 error was harmless. |
| Admission of West Court evidence & double jeopardy (Counts 2–5) | Patterson: admitting West Court evidence at conspiracy trial precludes later prosecution on Counts 2–5 (double jeopardy/collateral estoppel). | Government: the substantive counts are distinct; "same evidence" is not a bar; evidence was relevant to conspiracy issues (knowledge, connection). | Admission proper; double jeopardy/collateral estoppel not implicated (Felix); severed counts remain prosecutable. |
| Requested "mere presence" jury instruction (Majors) | Majors: requested an instruction emphasizing mere presence cannot establish guilt. | Court/Gov: proposed wording was misleading and the court’s given instructions covered the substance. | Denial not an abuse of discretion; jury was properly instructed that mere presence/knowledge alone is insufficient. |
| Removal/replacement of Juror LeClair during deliberations | Defendants: dismissal improper because jurors first moved after deadlock—possible that removal was to eliminate a holdout, violating unanimity protection. | Court/Gov: LeClair was not candid during voir dire about drug‑related associations; juror misconduct justified removal; interviews avoided revealing verdict leanings. | Majority: removal within discretion—clear evidence of juror misconduct and no reasonable indication removal stemmed from views on sufficiency. Concurring opinion: would reverse because record left a real possibility removal targeted a holdout. |
| Sufficiency of evidence (Majors) | Majors: testimony uncorroborated; evidence insufficient to convict. | Government: multiple cooperating witnesses, arrests, vehicle with 26 kg, wiretap corroboration, and other evidence support conviction. | Conviction supported; viewing evidence in light most favorable to prosecution, a rational jury could convict. |
| Procedural & substantive reasonableness of Majors’ 360‑month sentence | Majors: challenged as excessive given minor role and age; argued for downward departure. | Court: Guidelines range 360 months–life based on quantity and criminal history; court considered mitigating factors and sentenced at bottom of range. | Sentence affirmed as procedurally and substantively reasonable. |
| Patterson’s recidivism enhancement (mandatory life) — Sixth Amendment challenge | Patterson: Almendarez‑Torres may have been undermined by Booker/Shepard/Alleyne; prior‑conviction enhancement requires jury finding. | Government: Almendarez‑Torres remains controlling Supreme Court precedent; prior convictions are sentencing facts for judge. | Challenge rejected; Almendarez‑Torres upheld by Sixth Circuit precedent—enhancement lawful. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (good‑faith exception to exclusionary rule)
- United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522 (on‑record ex parte juror conference about safety does not require defendant’s presence)
- Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (conspicuous security deployment not inherently prejudicial)
- United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (admission of evidence at one trial does not bar later prosecution on different offenses)
- Brown v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir.) (juror removal rules; protect holdouts and jury secrecy)
- United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir.) (limits on juror removal when request may stem from views on sufficiency)
- United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257 (3d Cir.) (permissive investigation of juror misconduct where substantial evidence of misconduct)
- Almendarez‑Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (prior convictions as sentencing factor)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (distinguishing facts that increase mandatory minimums requiring jury finding)