United States v. Henry Alvin, Jr.
701 F. App'x 151
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Police in an apartment-complex parking lot in a high-crime area at night observed Henry Alvin sitting in a car; officers were in unmarked vehicles.
- According to government witnesses (credited by the district court), Alvin appeared "startled" when he recognized the unmarked car, exited his vehicle, and crouched in front of it as if hiding.
- Officers approached, identified themselves, instructed Alvin to place his hands on the back of his car, and detained him.
- While detained, an officer walked to the front of Alvin’s car, heard Alvin say something like “that’s my vehicle, stay away from it,” and then saw a handgun in the center-console cupholder.
- Alvin moved to suppress the firearm as the product of an unlawful Terry stop; the district court denied the motion without detailing its reasoning.
- Alvin reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling after a stipulated conviction; the Third Circuit reviews the denial de novo on legal questions and reverses the suppression denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop | Alvin: his startled reaction and crouch, without more, do not create particularized suspicion | Government: late hour, high-crime location, Alvin’s startled/crouching behavior and officers’ training produced reasonable suspicion | Court: No — those facts, in total, were insufficient to justify a Terry stop; suppression denial reversed |
| Whether officers’ training/observations can elevate ambiguous conduct into reasonable suspicion | Alvin: training cannot convert ambiguous, common nervousness into reasonable suspicion | Government: defer to officers’ training and observations about suspicious behavior | Court: Police training merits deference but not "blind deference"; training cannot make equivocal conduct satisfy Fourth Amendment standards |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishing standard for brief investigatory stops requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (nervous, evasive behavior can be a factor in reasonable-suspicion analysis in a high-crime context)
- United States v. Goodrich, 450 F.3d 552 (3d Cir. 2006) (high-crime area and time relevant but presence alone is insufficient; additional corroborating circumstances required)
- United States v. Peterson, 100 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1996) (ducking behavior combined with other facts during a consensual encounter supported search and seizure in that case)
- Arizona v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (totality-of-the-circumstances test for reasonable suspicion)