United States v. Henderson, 911 F.3d 32

Marcel Henderson was arrested on Jan. 2, 2011 after officers, briefed on intercepted calls indicating he was armed and dangerous, observed an altercation in which Henderson reached toward his waist; a subsequent traffic stop and pat-down produced a firearm.
Henderson was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm; convicted at trial in Oct. 2016; sentenced in Feb. 2017 to time served + 3 weeks imprisonment and three years supervised release.
Henderson moved to suppress the firearm evidence; the District Court held a three-day evidentiary hearing, made credibility findings, and denied suppression.
Henderson sought to assert a necessity/justification defense based on alleged imminent death threats from a gang; the District Court granted the government’s motion in limine to exclude that defense.
At sentencing the District Court treated a prior Massachusetts armed-robbery conviction as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), applying a higher base offense level (20); the government concedes that classification was erroneous but argues the error was harmless.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity of stop and frisk / suppression of firearm	Government: officers had reasonable suspicion based on wiretap briefings and an observed assaultive gesture	Henderson: District Court’s factual findings (credibility of officers) were erroneous; without credited officer testimony no reasonable suspicion existed	Denied; appellate court affirmed. Court reviewed credibility for clear error and found reasonable suspicion supported by wiretap briefing plus observed conduct
Exclusion of necessity/justification defense	Henderson: faced unlawful, imminent threats from gang, meeting Dixon imminence standard	Government: insufficient evidence of an imminent threat to permit the defense	Affirmed; court held record lacked evidence of an imminent threat required for necessity defense
Sentencing: classification of prior conviction as "crime of violence" under § 2K2.1	Henderson: prior convictions did not qualify as crimes of violence; Guidelines calc. erroneous	Government: concedes error but argues it was harmless because District Court would have imposed same sentence to allow a "structured transition" (halfway house)	Affirmed; court agreed error was procedural but harmless because sentencing rationale supported same outcome

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (established investigatory stop and frisk standard)
Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (reasonable-suspicion standard lower than probable cause)
Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (necessity/justification defense and imminence requirement)
Maxwell v. United States, 254 F.3d 21 (First Circuit on imminence standard for necessity defense)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (procedural error in Guidelines calculation)
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (harmlessness inquiry where Guidelines range miscalculated)