United States v. Hector Rengifo
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14399
| 3rd Cir. | 2016Background
- Hector Rengifo pled guilty in 2014 to distribution and possession with intent to distribute heroin; Guidelines range (with acceptance) was 15–21 months before career-offender treatment.
- Government sought career-offender enhancement based on two prior state drug convictions (1999 and 2007); District Court applied the enhancement and sentenced Rengifo to 120 months after a downward variance.
- The dispute centers on whether the 1999 Pennsylvania conviction (original sentence “time served to 12 months,” multiple parole revocations and additional time imposed) counts as a prior sentence exceeding 1 year and 1 month under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k).
- § 4A1.2(k) instructs courts to “add the original term of imprisonment to any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation” when computing prior sentences; the Guidelines do not define “term of imprisonment.”
- Rengifo argued the relevant “term” is the actual time served (365 days), falling below the 1 year + 1 month threshold; the government argued the term is the pronounced maximums (totaling >1 year + 1 month), which triggers career-offender status.
- The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that “term of imprisonment” is synonymous with “sentence of imprisonment” and is measured by the pronounced maximums, not time actually served.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of “term of imprisonment” in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k) | Rengifo: means actual time served; his 1999 term = 365 days, below threshold | Government: means pronounced sentence(s)/maximums; add original + revocation terms to exceed threshold | Court: synonym of “sentence of imprisonment”; use stated maximums and add original + revocation terms |
| Whether Application Note 11 allows counting pronounced sentences together | Rengifo: note doesn't make terms interchangeable; wording choice matters | Gov: Note instructs adding original sentence to resentence; terms used interchangeably | Held: Note shows interchangeability; interpret Commentary as authoritative unless inconsistent |
| Double-counting and due-process concerns from counting pronounced sentences | Rengifo: counting pronounced terms double-counts and lacks notice | Gov: Guidelines foresee this; criminal-history points based on pronounced sentence, not time served | Held: No due-process violation; Guidelines prescribe using pronounced maximums and permit this result |
| Rule of lenity applicability | Rengifo: ambiguous term should be construed for defendant | Gov: provision unambiguous when read with Application Notes | Held: Provision unambiguous; lenity does not apply |
Key Cases Cited
- Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (Guidelines commentary is authoritative unless unconstitutional or plainly erroneous)
- Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994) (no due-process requirement to warn a defendant that a conviction may be used to enhance a future sentence)
- Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995) (rule of lenity applies only when interpretation remains genuinely ambiguous after all aids are considered)
- United States v. McKoy, 452 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2006) (standards for appellate review of guideline interpretation)
- United States v. Ramirez-Perez, 643 F.3d 173 (6th Cir. 2011) (interpreting similar Guidelines language and treating terms as interchangeable)
- United States v. Jasso, 587 F.3d 706 (5th Cir. 2009) (same conclusion regarding counting original and revoked sentences)