853 F.3d 331
7th Cir.2017Background
- Haslage and Toney were registered sex offenders previously living in Wisconsin who moved to Washington and Minnesota, respectively, and failed to register in their new states as required by SORNA.
- Both were indicted in the Eastern District of Wisconsin under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 for failure to register after interstate travel.
- Each moved to dismiss the indictment for improper venue; district courts granted the motions and dismissed.
- The government appealed, arguing venue in Wisconsin was proper because travel from Wisconsin was part of the § 2250 offense.
- The Seventh Circuit majority relied on Nichols v. United States to hold that the SORNA registration offense occurs in the new jurisdiction where the offender fails to register, not in the departure state.
- The court affirmed the dismissals; a dissent argued § 3237(a) and Carr support Wisconsin venue because interstate travel is an element of the offense for state offenders.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether venue is proper in the departure district for § 2250 prosecutions when offender travels out-of-state and fails to register in the new state | Haslage/Toney: travel does not create venue in Wisconsin because the failure to register occurred in the new state | Government: interstate travel is an element/part of the § 2250 offense; venue allowed where offense began (Wisconsin) | Venue improper in Wisconsin; offenses occurred in the new jurisdictions (affirm dismissal) |
| Whether Nichols forecloses treating departure-state conduct as part of the § 2250 offense | Defendants: Nichols interpreted § 16913 to require registration in the current (present-tense) jurisdiction, so departure-state has no continuing role | Government: Nichols addressed statutory duty, not the elements or venue for § 2250 | Court: Nichols controls; leaving a state is not a separable part of the § 2250 offense for venue purposes |
| Whether Rodriguez-Moreno (and related multi-district venue precedent) requires examining travel contacts to permit venue in departure state | Government: Rodriguez-Moreno permits venue where distinct parts occur across districts; travel is part of the conduct | Defendants: § 2250’s offense is sequential (travel then failure to register), not distinct concurrent elements spanning multiple districts | Court: Rodriguez-Moreno inapposite; unlike statutes that criminalize travel with intent, § 2250 criminalizes the failure to register in the new jurisdiction |
| Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) permits prosecution where the offense began (departure state) | Government (dissent): § 3237(a) allows prosecution in any district where an offense begun, continued, or completed; travel began in Wisconsin | Defendants: the crime (failure to register) began where the failure occurred; travel is only a precursor, not the criminal act for venue | Majority: § 3237(a) does not override Nichols; the criminal conduct under § 2250 occurred in the new state where registration was required |
Key Cases Cited
- Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113 (2016) (SORNA’s present-tense "resides" limits the duty to update to the offender’s current jurisdiction)
- Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010) (elements of § 2250 include a qualifying offense, interstate travel, and failure to register)
- United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999) (venue proper where distinct parts of a multi-part offense occurred)
- United States v. Orona-Ibarra, 831 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2016) (Congress may authorize venue in any district where conduct that is part of the offense occurred)
- United States v. O’Hara, 301 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2002) (Travel Act precedent treating travel with intent as the predicate offense)
- United States v. Sanders, 622 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010) (analysis that § 2250’s elements are sequential rather than concurrent)