United States v. Harry Humphries
728 F.3d 1028
| 9th Cir. | 2013Background
- Humphries co-owned a chemical-blending company that accumulated used toluene and excess methanol stored at a rented facility.
- In late 2005 the building was sold, the company shut down, and Humphries arranged for EnviroClean (a permitted hazardous-waste firm) to remove the chemicals in early 2006.
- In 2010 Humphries was indicted under RCRA § 6928(d)(2) for knowingly storing hazardous wastes without a permit between Sept. 30 and Dec. 6, 2005.
- At trial Humphries argued he reused/sold the materials (not storing) and that he had decided to dispose of the wastes (so they were not stored) while awaiting pickup.
- During deliberations the jury asked when “disposal” begins — the decision to dispose or the act of disposal — and the district court answered that disposal begins with the act of disposal (supplementing the statutory definitions).
- The jury returned a guilty verdict; Humphries appealed challenging the supplemental instruction as legally incorrect and as invading the jury’s factfinding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of “disposal” under RCRA | Humphries: “Disposal” includes the decision or intent to discard; once he decided to dispose, the material was not being "stored." | Government: “Disposal” means the physical acts (discharge, deposit, placing, etc.); decision alone is insufficient. | Court: "Disposal" unambiguously refers to acts of discharging/depositing/placing; the district court correctly instructed disposal begins with the act. |
| Whether the supplemental instruction misstated law | Humphries: The instruction misstated §6903(3) and §6903(33) by ignoring intent/decision. | Government: Statutory text and scheme show disposal = acts; interpreting otherwise would nullify storage prohibition. | Court: Instruction correctly stated law; district court did not err. |
| Whether the instruction invaded the jury’s role/favored the government | Humphries: The instruction effectively foreclosed his defense that he lacked guilty knowledge because he had decided to remove wastes. | Government: The instruction only defined “disposal” and did not prevent the jury from finding lack of knowing storage. | Court: No invasion; instruction left the mens rea question for jury and did not preclude defense. |
| Abuse of discretion in responding to jury question | Humphries: Supplemental answer was improper and prejudicial. | Government: Trial court has wide discretion and gave a correct, clarifying response. | Court: No abuse of discretion; response was legally accurate and unlikely to mislead. |
Key Cases Cited
- Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (statutory interpretation first asks whether language is plain)
- Ron Pair Enters., Inc. v. United States, 489 U.S. 235 (interpretation ends if statutory language is unambiguous)
- United States v. Verduzco, 373 F.3d 1022 (review standard for district court responses to jury inquiries)
- United States v. Havelock, 664 F.3d 1284 (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 988 (trial courts have wide discretion in jury instructions)
- Am. Chemistry Council v. EPA, 337 F.3d 1060 (RCRA’s cradle-to-grave regulatory purpose)