United States v. Harrison
2:07-cr-00053
D. UtahMay 10, 2021Background
- William Harrison pled guilty to two counts of discharging a firearm during a crime of violence (§ 924(c)) as part of a multi-count armed bank robbery case and was sentenced on June 2, 2009 to 10 years (Count 4) plus a consecutive 25 years (Count 5) — total 35 years; he has served ~14 years; projected release date Dec. 11, 2036.
- Harrison moved pro se (later supplemented by counsel) for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), seeking immediate release or reduction to 20 years, citing the First Step Act changes to § 924(c) and health concerns (including COVID-19); exhaustion was not disputed.
- The First Step Act narrowed § 924(c) stacking so a 25-year consecutive mandatory minimum applies only to recidivist offenses; Congress did not make that change retroactive to already-imposed sentences.
- Tenth Circuit framework: district courts decide what qualifies as "extraordinary and compelling" but must also consider Sentencing Commission policy statements and § 3553(a) factors; courts may grant individualized relief for pre-First Step Act stacked sentences when unique circumstances exist.
- The district court found Harrison’s sentence was substantially longer than it would be today (35 vs. ~20 years), notably longer than his co-defendant’s, combined with Harrison’s age, chronic health issues, custodial record, and rehabilitative programming — together amounting to extraordinary and compelling reasons.
- The court granted compassionate release in part, reducing Harrison’s sentence from 35 to 22 years (supervised release conditions unchanged); immediate release based on COVID-19 was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the change to § 924(c) and "stacked" pre‑First Step Act sentence can be an extraordinary and compelling reason for release | Gov't: Pre‑First Step Act sentences alone cannot justify relief; relief must be individualized and consider policy and § 3553(a) | Harrison: Stacking made his sentence far longer than current law would allow; combined with health/age, that is extraordinary and compelling | Court: Yes — the combination of sentencing disparity, age, health, and custodial record constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons on an individualized basis |
| Whether Harrison exhausted administrative remedies | Gov't: Exhaustion requirement must be met | Harrison: Exhaustion met (not disputed) | Court: Exhaustion satisfied (no dispute) |
| Whether a reduction is consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements | Gov't: Commission’s policy statement governing BOP-filed motions applies and limits relief | Harrison: District courts retain discretion to define extraordinary and compelling for direct motions | Court: Existing Commission statements do not constrain courts here; district courts may determine extraordinary and compelling reasons for direct motions |
| Whether § 3553(a) factors support relief and the extent of reduction | Gov't: § 3553(a) factors (seriousness, deterrence, public safety) counsel against large reductions | Harrison: § 3553(a) factors, plus rehabilitation and age, support a reduced term (to ~20 years) | Court: § 3553(a) factors support reducing sentence to 22 years (balances punishment, deterrence, rehab, and risk) |
Key Cases Cited
- Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (finality generally bars resentencing)
- Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (retroactivity of statutory sentencing changes is for Congress to decide)
- United States v. Willis, 382 F. Supp. 3d 1185 (First Step Act permits direct prisoner motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A))