289 A.3d 1060
Pa.2023Background
- Marc J. Harris received a federal sentence under the ACCA based in part on a prior Pennsylvania conviction for first‑degree aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1).
- The Third Circuit certified the question whether § 2702(a)(1) contains an element requiring the use, attempted use, or threatened use of "physical force" as that phrase is relevant to ACCA predicate analysis.
- Commonwealth v. Thomas (Pa. Super.) involved a parent who starved her child to death; the Superior Court upheld conviction under § 2702(a)(1) and said use/threat of force is not an element.
- The United States and Pennsylvania Attorney General argued § 2702(a)(1) requires physical force because it criminalizes causing "serious bodily injury," and the provision derives from the Model Penal Code and common‑law force concepts.
- Harris (and the Third Circuit in Mayo) argued § 2702(a)(1) contains no express force element and covers acts and omissions that cause serious bodily injury without physical force.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held § 2702(a)(1) does not require physical force; causing or attempting to cause serious bodily injury is the element, and physical force is only one possible means of doing so.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1) requires some use of physical force | United States: "serious bodily injury" necessarily entails physical force, so § 2702(a)(1) qualifies as an ACCA force offense | Harris: statute's text contains no force element; liability is for causing/attempting serious bodily injury by any means (including omissions) | The Court: No. § 2702(a)(1) does not include a physical‑force element; serious bodily injury is the harm element, not limited to forceful means |
| Whether the certified question improperly asked the state court to construe a federal term ("physical force") | United States: federal courts, not state courts, should define ACCA "physical force" for predicate analysis | Harris: PA court may and should determine the elements of the state offense | The Court: The question was properly limited to whether the state statute requires physical force; that is a question of state law the PA Supreme Court may answer |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishes the categorical approach for ACCA predicate offenses)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (invalidated ACCA residual clause)
- Castleman v. United States, 572 U.S. 157 (discusses when "physical force" is satisfied by causing bodily injury)
- Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (elements vs. facts distinction for categorical approach)
- Gonzales v. Duenas‑Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (realistic probability standard for state statute covering broader conduct)
- Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (Johnson retroactivity on collateral review)
- United States v. Mayo, 901 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2018) (Third Circuit decision holding § 2702(a)(1) lacks a physical‑force element)
- United States v. Ramos, 892 F.3d 599 (3d Cir. 2018) (distinguishing § 2702(a)(4) as involving force via a deadly weapon)
- Commonwealth v. Thomas, 867 A.2d 594 (Pa. Super. 2005) (upheld § 2702(a)(1) conviction for child starvation and stated force is not an element)
- Commonwealth v. Hart, 28 A.3d 898 (Pa. 2011) (courts must not judicially add elements the legislature omitted)