United States v. Harris
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 103
| 10th Cir. | 2017Background
- Michael Harris was sentenced under the ACCA to a 15-year mandatory minimum in 2004 based on three prior convictions, including a 1979 Colorado robbery. He later filed a § 2255 motion after the Supreme Court invalidated the ACCA residual clause.
- Johnson v. United States (2015) ("Johnson II") struck the ACCA residual clause; Welch held that decision retroactive on collateral review, prompting Harris’s § 2255 challenge.
- The parties agreed the question was whether Colorado statutory robbery qualifies as a "violent felony" under the ACCA elements clause (i.e., whether the statute has as an element the use/attempted use/threatened use of "physical force" against another).
- The district court found Colorado robbery qualifies because Colorado law requires a "violent taking" and treats threats/intimidation as encompassing force or violence.
- Harris argued Colorado’s robbery can be based on less-than-ACCA-level force (de minimis/constructive force), so his prior robbery would not count; the government argued Colorado robbery meets the ACCA’s "physical force" (violent force) standard.
- The Tenth Circuit applied the categorical approach and concluded Colorado robbery—by force or by threats/intimidation as construed by Colorado courts—categorically involves "physical force" meaning violent force capable of causing pain or injury; it affirmed the denial of § 2255 relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Harris) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Colorado robbery is a "violent felony" under the ACCA elements clause | Colorado robbery can be based on de minimis or non-violent constructive means (threats/intimidation) and thus may not meet ACCA "physical force" requirement | Colorado robbery requires a "violent taking"; threats/intimidation in Colorado law involve force or violence and thus meet ACCA "physical force" | Colorado robbery categorically satisfies the elements clause: it requires the use or threatened use of "physical force" (i.e., violent force capable of causing pain or injury). |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (defines "physical force" in ACCA as "violent force" capable of causing pain or injury)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (struck the ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (held Johnson II retroactive on collateral review)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (explains and requires the categorical approach)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (instructs focus on the least culpable conduct with realistic probability standard)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (discusses scope of "physical force" and provides illustrative conduct)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (on indivisible statutes and categorical approach)
