United States v. Harlem Suarez
893 F.3d 1330
| 11th Cir. | 2018Background
- In 2015 Suarez created an ISIS-themed Facebook profile, posted propaganda, solicited bomb-making help, and sought recruits.
- FBI confidential informants and undercover agents (posing as ISIS members and a bomb-maker) communicated with Suarez, met him in person, and supplied a nonfunctional “bomb.”
- Suarez purchased materials (nails, backpack, prepaid phone), delivered them to an undercover, accepted the completed inert device, and described plans to detonate it on a crowded Key West beach and against police targets.
- At arrest Suarez admitted owning firearms (AR-15 and two Glocks) and acknowledged the bomb plan and intended cellphone detonator; a grand jury indicted him for attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction (18 U.S.C. § 2332a) and attempted provision of material support to a foreign terrorist organization (18 U.S.C. § 2339B).
- A jury convicted after an eight-day trial; the district court sentenced Suarez to life without parole on the WMD count and a concurrent 20-year term on the material-support count; Suarez appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Suarez's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for § 2332a interstate-commerce element | Government had to show a substantial effect on interstate commerce; evidence was insufficient | Minimal (de minimis) effect is enough; tourism impact testimony sufficed | Reversed argument: minimal effect suffices; testimony about potential tourism/economic harm supported jurisdiction and conviction |
| Sufficiency of evidence for attempted provision of material support (§ 2339B) | No real contact with ISIS; interactions were only with government agents, so insufficient | Defendant’s intent to aid ISIS and substantial steps (propaganda, materials, coordination) suffice even if contacts were undercover | Evidence supported specific intent and substantial steps; conviction affirmed |
| Eighth Amendment: life without parole cruel and unusual? | Sentence disproportionate given age, low intellect, immaturity, and lack of completed harm | Crime was attempt to kill many; life sentence not grossly disproportionate | No plain-error relief; sentence not Eighth Amendment violation |
| Sentencing: procedural (double counting) and substantive reasonableness | §3A1.4 terrorism enhancement double-counted harms already accounted by §2M6.1; overall sentence substantively unreasonable | Guidelines sections address distinct sentencing considerations; court properly weighed §3553(a) factors and the nature of attempt offenses | No plain error on double counting; district court did not abuse discretion on substantive reasonableness |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (commerce clause limits and substantial-effects inquiry)
- United States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384 (Section-with-jurisdictional-hook: minimal interstate-commerce showing suffices)
- United States v. Mann, 701 F.3d 274 (de minimis interstate-commerce effect satisfies §2332a)
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (impossibility defense when defendant’s belief about facts is incorrect)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (juvenile life-without-parole limitations and culpability distinctions)
- Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (upholding non-capital life-without-parole sentences)
- United States v. Dudley, 463 F.3d 1221 (double-counting standard in Sentencing Guidelines)
- United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085 (sentencing for attempt offenses: focus on potential, not realized, harm)