United States v. Hancock
168 F. Supp. 3d 817
D. Maryland2016Background
- Defendant convicted by jury of Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951), brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), and felon-in-possession.
- Count Two (§ 924(c)) relied on the Hobbs Act robbery conviction (Count One) as the predicate "crime of violence."
- Defendant moved to dismiss Count Two post-conviction, arguing Johnson II (invalidating ACCA residual clause) undermines § 924(c)’s definition of "crime of violence."
- Court framed the threshold question as whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)’s force clause or residual clause.
- The Court concluded Hobbs Act robbery is divisible only as between robbery and extortion; the robbery subsection is indivisible as to its alternative means, so the categorical approach applies.
- Applying the categorical approach, the Court held Hobbs Act robbery necessarily contains an element of the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against person or property and therefore is a categorical "crime of violence," denying the motion to dismiss Count Two.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery is divisible for the modified categorical approach | Hobbs Act contains alternative elements (robbery vs extortion) so modified categorical may apply to identify predicate | Hobbs Act robbery language sets out alternative means, not alternative elements, so categorical approach should apply | Court: Statute divisible as to robbery vs extortion; but robbery subsection is indivisible — use categorical approach to analyze robbery |
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery (§1951(b)(1)) qualifies as a "crime of violence" under §924(c)'s force clause | N/A (government argued it does) | Hancock argued Hobbs Act permits conviction based on causing fear of injury to intangible property (e.g., threatening to devalue stocks), which does not involve physical force, so it is not a "crime of violence" under §924(c) | Court: "Fear of injury" in robbery context requires the use or threatened use of physical force against person or property; Hobbs Act robbery is a categorical crime of violence under the force clause |
| Whether Torres‑Miguel and related precedent preclude treating "fear of injury" as physical force | N/A | Defense relied on Torres‑Miguel to argue fear-based offenses can involve non-physical threats and thus fall outside force clause | Court: Distinguished Torres‑Miguel — Hobbs Act robbery requires a taking from another by fear that facilitates the taking, which necessarily entails use/threat of physical force |
| Whether Court must reach §924(c) residual clause question after holding force-clause applies | N/A | Defense argued residual-clause vagueness (Johnson II) undermines §924(c) | Court: Did not need to reach residual-clause arguments because force clause sufficed; denied motion to dismiss |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defined "physical force" in ACCA context as "violent force")
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (held ACCA residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (explained categorical vs modified categorical approaches; use of Shepard documents)
- United States v. Torres‑Miguel, 701 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2012) (interpreted criminal‑threat statute; held result‑oriented threat need not involve use of physical force)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (discussed force and common‑law meaning in misdemeanor‑crime‑of‑violence context)
- United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485 (4th Cir. 2015) (discussed §924(c) definitions and categorical approach)