354 F. Supp. 3d 28
D.C. Cir.2018Background
- Defendant Hammond filed a timely (within one year of Johnson) 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his sentence as enhanced by the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines' residual clause.
- The government argued Hammond's motion was untimely or procedurally defaulted and that Johnson applies only to the ACCA, not the (mandatory) Guidelines.
- The court rejected the government’s procedural defenses, holding timeliness under § 2255(f)(3) depends on the right a petitioner "asserts," not on whether the right in fact applies to the petitioner’s case; procedural default also excused given Johnson’s novelty and prejudice shown.
- On the merits the court held Johnson’s vagueness rule extends to mandatory (pre-Booker) Guidelines residual clauses, but relief still requires that prior convictions not qualify under the Guidelines’ elements or enumerated- felonies clauses.
- The court found Hammond’s prior Maryland armed-robbery conviction and his federal bank-robbery conviction (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) each qualify as crimes of violence under the Guidelines’ elements clause, so Hammond remains a career offender and his sentence stands.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) | Hammond: motion filed within one year of Johnson asserting the right recognized in Johnson, so timely | Gov't: Johnson limited to ACCA; motions attacking Guidelines residual clause therefore untimely | Court: Timeliness is measured by the right "asserted" (when Supreme Court recognized it); Hammond's motion is timely |
| Whether Johnson’s vagueness rule extends to mandatory Guidelines residual clause | Hammond: Johnson announced a general right not to be sentenced under an indeterminate residual clause; that right applies to mandatory Guidelines | Gov't: Johnson was ACCA-specific; Beckles and other authority limit Johnson’s reach | Court: Johnson’s rule applies to mandatory Guidelines residual clauses (pre-Booker mandatory Guidelines functioned like law) |
| Procedural default / cause and prejudice | Hammond: Johnson was unforeseeable; cause and prejudice exist because sentence likely would be reduced | Gov't: Hammond defaulted by not appealing; futility is not cause; retroactivity lacking | Court: Default excused—Johnson was novel and prejudicial; Welch made Johnson retroactive; relief not barred by procedural default |
| Whether Hammond’s prior convictions qualify as crimes of violence under elements clause | Hammond: § 2113(a) (bank robbery) can be committed without violent force or with less-than-intentional mens rea, so not a categorical crime of violence | Gov't: Intimidation in § 2113(a) necessarily threatens violent force and § 2113(a) is a general-intent (knowing) crime satisfying elements clause | Court: § 2113(a) involves intimidation that threats violent force and requires at least knowledge; convictions qualify under the elements clause, so sentence remains valid |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (invalidating the ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (holding Johnson is substantive and retroactive)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (explaining vagueness doctrine and distinguishing advisory Guidelines)
- Dimaya v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (applying Johnson’s reasoning to a different statutory residual clause)
- Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353 (interpreting § 2255(f)(3) timeliness language)
- Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (holding Guidelines were mandatory pre-Booker and had legal effect)
- Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) as a general-intent crime)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (discussing mens rea component of crime-of-violence definitions)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (doctrine on divisible statutes for categorical approach)
- Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (limiting convictions based solely on an objective reasonable-person test for threats)