United States v. Hager
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 12575
| 4th Cir. | 2013Background
- Thomas Morocco Hager was tried in federal court for murdering Barbara White while allegedly participating in a conspiracy to distribute ≥50g crack cocaine; jury convicted and recommended death; sentence affirmed by district court and appealed.
- Trial was trifurcated: guilt, death-eligibility (statutory aggravators), and sentencing (weighing aggravators vs mitigators). Jury found multiple statutory and non‑statutory aggravators, including torture and future dangerousness; several mitigators received limited juror support.
- Government’s theory: Hager killed White to protect his hiding place, his drug operation, and his ties with co‑conspirators; evidence included prior shootings, use of guns, the murder’s brutality, and post‑murder statements/bragging.
- Hager raised multiple challenges on appeal: sufficiency of nexus under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) (third prong), jury instructions about the required nexus, anonymity of the jury, seating of Juror 144, exclusion of certain mitigating (execution‑impact) evidence from his daughters, jury information about co‑defendants’ sentence‑reduction prospects, admission of future‑dangerousness evidence, and the instruction on weighing aggravators vs mitigators.
- The Fourth Circuit majority affirmed conviction and death sentence, rejecting Hager’s challenges as to sufficiency of the drug‑murder nexus, jury instruction wording, anonymous jury, juror retention, evidentiary rulings on mitigation and future dangerousness, and the statutory procedure for weighing aggravators and mitigators.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't) | Defendant's Argument (Hager) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of nexus under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) (prong 3) | Evidence showed a substantive nexus: Hager killed White to protect his drug operation/safe house and to solidify co‑conspirator loyalty; temporal overlap plus drug‑related motives suffice. | § 848(e)(1)(A) should reach only killings during or in furtherance of drug trafficking; conspiracy membership alone is insufficient — charging prong 3 lacks nexus here. | Affirmed: substantial evidence supported a substantive (meaningful) connection; conspiracy involvement + drug‑related motives satisfied prong 3. |
| Jury instruction on “engaging in” nexus (wording: "meaningful") | Instruction accurately conveyed necessity of a meaningful connection; no reversible error given overwhelming record support. | Requested instruction required contemporaneous active drug act or that killing be directly integral to trafficking; court’s “meaningful” term was too vague/insufficient. | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion; "meaningful" was adequate and not prejudicial. |
| Exclusion of daughters’ videotapes and execution‑impact testimony | Execution‑impact evidence is not a proper mitigator; testimony about father–child relationship allowed in limited, relevant form; exclusion was within discretion. | Excluding videos and testimony about daughters’ love/impact denied Hager the right to present mitigating evidence. | Affirmed: execution‑impact evidence properly excluded as irrelevant to defendant’s character/record; permitted testimony covered relevant relationship evidence. |
| Whether jury must weigh aggravators vs mitigators beyond a reasonable doubt | Statute and precedent permit jurors to make the ultimate moral judgment in selection phase; reasonable doubt applies to finding statutory aggravators, not the weighing process. | Due process/Apprendi/Ring require beyond‑reasonable‑doubt standard for the ultimate finding that aggravators outweigh mitigators. | Affirmed: reasonable‑doubt standard not required for the jury’s discretionary moral weighing; court followed governing statutory scheme and precedent. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging a substantive nexus requirement under § 848(e))
- United States v. Aguilar, 585 F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing the three prongs of § 848(e)(1)(A) and substantive‑connection approaches)
- United States v. Desinor, 525 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding drug‑related motive need only be one purpose to satisfy a substantive connection)
- Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (sentencer must be able to consider any relevant mitigating evidence)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (capital sentencing and jury factfinding principles informing Apprendi line of cases)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury)
- Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (victim‑impact evidence admissible in sentencing to show harm caused)