United States v. Guillermo Arriaga-Pinon
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 6030
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Arriaga-Pinon pleaded no contest in 2014 to violating Cal. Veh. Code § 10851(a) (unlawful driving/taking a vehicle) and was later removed to Mexico in 2015.
- In 2016 he was found in the U.S.; charged with unlawful reentry under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b).
- At sentencing the government sought an 8-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) as Arriaga’s § 10851(a) conviction was an aggravated-felony theft offense.
- The district court applied the modified categorical approach and imposed an 18‑month sentence (bottom of the Guideline range).
- On appeal Arriaga argued (1) Mathis v. United States rendered § 10851(a) indivisible so the modified categorical approach cannot apply, and (2) alternatively, even if divisible, the record of conviction does not unambiguously show he was convicted of generic theft.
- The Ninth Circuit agreed with Arriaga’s alternative argument: the record of conviction did not establish that he was convicted as a principal (generic theft) rather than as an accessory after the fact, so the enhancement could not be applied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 10851(a) is divisible such that the modified categorical approach applies | Arriaga: Mathis requires treating § 10851(a) as indivisible, so modified categorical approach cannot be used | Government: § 10851(a) is divisible (principals vs accessories) and Mathis does not overrule prior Ninth Circuit divisibility holdings | Court did not decide divisibility definitively; assumed prior divisibility precedent for analysis but found resolution unnecessary because of the record deficiency |
| Whether the record of conviction shows Arriaga was convicted of generic theft (principal) under the modified categorical approach | Arriaga: Conviction documents are ambiguous—plea was to the statute, not to specific factual basis, so they don’t show he was a principal | Government: Plea and charging documents sufficiently indicate an auto‑theft conviction qualifying as generic theft | Held for Arriaga: the judicially noticeable record (charging doc, plea colloquy, plea form) does not unambiguously show he was convicted as a principal rather than an accessory after the fact, so enhancement cannot be applied |
| Whether Vidal and Duenas‑Alvarez compel a different outcome | Arriaga: Vidal supports reversal because similar record there defeated enhancement; Mathis may require overruling Duenas‑Alvarez | Government: Duenas‑Alvarez supports treating § 10851(a) as divisible and applying modified categorical approach | Court: Vidal controls the sufficiency-of-the-record analysis here; Duenas‑Alvarez need not be overruled to resolve this case |
| Remedy: whether sentence enhancement must be vacated | Arriaga: Yes—vacate and remand for resentencing without the § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) enhancement | Government: Enhancement was properly applied | Court: Reversed and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishes categorical approach for predicate offenses)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (limits documents courts may consult when applying modified categorical approach)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (clarifies modified categorical approach and distinguishes elements from means)
- Vidal v. United States, 504 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir.) (similar record—plea to § 10851(a) did not show conviction as principal; no enhancement)
- Duenas‑Alvarez v. Holder, 733 F.3d 812 (9th Cir.) (held § 10851(a) divisible in prior Ninth Circuit precedent)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (discussed in Mathis regarding when alternatives constitute elements)
- United States v. Corona‑Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir.) (on categorical‑match analysis)