United States v. Groysman
766 F.3d 147
| 2d Cir. | 2014Background
- Lyubov Groysman was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to commit health-care fraud and money laundering; sentenced to 97 months' imprisonment and forfeiture. The conviction followed an FBI/DHS/IRS/NYPD investigation into DME (durable medical equipment) fraud.
- The government’s case relied heavily on DHS Special Agent Semyon Ginzburg, who ran the undercover "street operation" and testified about recorded meetings and translations from Russian, and on two cooperating witnesses who prepared fictitious invoices and cashed checks.
- Ginzburg prepared and sponsored several charts (GX 59–65, GX 75) summarizing the scheme and depicting cash flows; he also testified about what occurred in meetings inside the defendant’s office though he lacked first-hand knowledge of many events and relied on debriefings of the cooperators.
- Defense was that Groysman was a part-time clerk following instructions from an owner (Branfenbrener) and unaware of fraud; limited admissible evidence tied Groysman to receiving cash—primarily one cooperator’s testimony that lacked independent corroboration.
- On appeal the government conceded that Ginzburg’s testimony included inadmissible hearsay and opinion, and that the charts were improperly admitted and in some respects inaccurate and misleading. The Second Circuit found the cumulative errors undermined confidence in the verdict and ordered a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Groysman) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of agent’s testimony recounting statements by cooperators (hearsay) | Testimony was admissible/contextual and harmless because cooperators’ testimony and documentary evidence corroborated it | Ginzburg’s recounting of debriefings was hearsay and prejudicial; he lacked first‑hand knowledge | Court: Error was plain; hearsay testimony materially prejudiced the trial and supports new trial |
| Agent’s opinion testimony about defendant’s culpability | Any opinion was cumulative and harmless given other strong evidence | Agent impermissibly vouched and offered lay/expert opinion beyond personal knowledge | Court: Opinion testimony was improper, prejudicial given agent’s investigative role and language expertise |
| Admission of summary charts (GX 59–65, GX 75) | Charts summarized evidence; any foundation defects were harmless because cooperators and records corroborated scheme | Charts were not Rule 1006 summaries, were based on hearsay, lacked foundation, and were misleading/inaccurate | Court: Charts improperly admitted, based on hearsay and inaccurate; admission was prejudicial and contributed to unfair trial |
| Whether errors meet plain‑error standard (affect substantial rights / fairness) | Conceded some errors but argued harmless given other admissible evidence and recordings | Sought reversal or new trial because cumulative errors created reasonable probability of different outcome | Court: Errors affected substantial rights and seriously undermined trial fairness; conviction vacated and remanded for new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gomez, 617 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2010) (harmless‑error factors for evidentiary errors)
- United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2005) (limitations on opinion testimony by non‑experts)
- United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2003) (case‑agent opinion and expert/lay testimony distinctions)
- United States v. Citron, 783 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1986) (foundation and admissibility of summary exhibits)
- Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997) (plain‑error review framework)
- United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (requirements for correcting forfeited error)
- Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004) (prejudice standard under plain error is reasonable probability of different outcome)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (undermining confidence in outcome as prejudice measure)
- United States v. Yakobowicz, 427 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2005) (interim summations by prosecutor/agent can be structural error)
- United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173 (2d Cir. 1981) (prohibition on prosecutor vouching for witnesses)
- United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1988) (impropriety of agent testimony vouching for credibility)
- United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1984) (concern about juror reliance on agent’s investigatory knowledge)