710 F.Supp.3d 1
D.D.C.2024Background
- Jeremy Daniel Groseclose was charged with six crimes related to the January 6, 2021, Capitol events, including two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1752 concerning entry into “restricted building or grounds.”
- The case was tried in a bench trial; the court previously found Groseclose guilty on four other counts but reserved judgment on the two § 1752 charges, seeking briefing on what “knowingly” means in this statutory context.
- The charges under § 1752 require the government to prove not just that the area was restricted but also that it was restricted due to the presence of a Secret Service protectee (then-Vice President Pence).
- Disagreement existed over whether the defendant had to know both that the area was restricted and that a Secret Service protectee was present.
- The court concluded that “knowingly” applies to the entire statutory definition of “restricted building or grounds,” requiring proof of knowledge of both elements.
- Because the government did not prove Groseclose knew Pence was present, the court acquitted him on these two counts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of “knowingly” under § 1752: Does it apply to the entire definition of "restricted building or grounds"? | Only need to show knowledge that building/grounds were posted, cordoned, or restricted; no need to prove knowledge of Secret Service protectee’s presence. | "Knowingly" extends to the entire statutory definition, so government must prove knowledge of both physical restriction and presence of Secret Service protectee. | "Knowingly" modifies the whole definition; Government must prove knowledge of both elements. |
| Statutory interpretation: Is the “Secret Service protectee” element jurisdictional only or an offense element? | It is jurisdictional only, so defendant's knowledge is irrelevant for that element. | It is an offense element that aggravates the crime, so knowledge is required. | Not jurisdictional only; it's an aggravating element requiring knowledge. |
| Statutory purpose: Should public safety override strict reading of mens rea? | Mens rea should be limited to enhance Secret Service protection, to avoid requiring notice of protectee location. | Plain statutory language and structure require knowledge for all elements. | Statutory text prevails; security concerns don’t override the mens rea requirement. |
| Sufficiency of the evidence: Did Groseclose know the VP was present? | Circumstantial evidence of motive and context is enough. | No direct evidence he knew Pence was present during the offense. | Insufficient evidence; acquittal on these counts. |
Key Cases Cited
- Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (presumption that mens rea applies to each element in criminal statutes)
- McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186 (2015) (knowledge applies to statutorily defined elements)
- Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) ("knowingly" extends to all elements unless context says otherwise)
- United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (distinguishing jurisdictional elements from offense elements)
- Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (presumption in favor of mens rea in criminal statutes)