549 F.Supp.3d 49
D.D.C.2021Background
- Couy Griffin attended the January 6, 2021 events and allegedly breached barricades on the U.S. Capitol grounds, climbed to the west-facing patio/deck, led prayers with a bullhorn, and remained about 90 minutes before leaving.
- The Government charged Griffin by Information with misdemeanor violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1) (unauthorized entry into a restricted building or grounds) and § 1752(a)(2) (disorderly or disruptive conduct with intent to impede).
- The U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) are alleged to have posted barriers and staffed them; the Government does not contend the Secret Service posted the restrictions.
- Griffin moved under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 to dismiss the Information, arguing § 1752 applies only where the Secret Service (not another agency) established the restricted area.
- The Court accepted the Information’s allegations as true for the motion, held a hearing, and denied Griffin’s motion to dismiss, allowing the prosecution to proceed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1752 requires the Secret Service to have created the restriction | § 1752’s text covers entry into any posted, cordoned, or otherwise restricted area where a Secret Service protectee is or will be visiting; it does not condition liability on which agency posted the restriction | Griffin: § 1752 implicitly requires the Secret Service (or its regulation) to establish the restricted area; otherwise statute’s focus on Secret Service protectees is hollow | Denied — Court reads statute plainly: who restricted the area is immaterial; statute targets conduct in a restricted area around a protectee, not the identity of the restricting agency |
| Vagueness challenge to § 1752 | Government: statute gives fair notice and, as applied, covers clearly posted barriers manned by uniformed officers | Griffin: statute is vague and invites arbitrary enforcement if any agency can designate a restricted area | Denied — Court finds definition of “restricted buildings or grounds” sufficiently clear and not unconstitutionally vague as applied here |
| Lenity / novel-construction / ex post facto concern | Government: text is not ambiguous and no unforeseeable judicial enlargement occurred | Griffin: ambiguous statute should be construed narrowly; novel enlargement triggers lenity or Bouie concerns | Denied — Court finds no grievous ambiguity and no unfair surprise warranting lenity or Bouie relief |
| Selective or discriminatory prosecution claim | Government: prosecutorial decisions presumed regular absent clear evidence of discriminatory intent | Griffin: prosecution is politically motivated/unequal compared to other January 6 participants | Denied — Griffin failed to produce clear evidence to overcome presumption of regularity; disparate charging decisions do not justify dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (2009) (start statutory interpretation with plain text)
- Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020) (plain statutory language ends the inquiry)
- Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011) (legislative history not consulted when text is clear)
- United States v. Bursey, 416 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2005) (interpreting § 1752 under prior statutory regime; not controlling on who must restrict area)
- United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997) (avoid reliance on legislative history where text is straightforward)
- City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (vagueness doctrine principles)
- United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (lenity and vagueness relationship)
- Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010) (lenity requires grievous ambiguity)
- Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) (party-suggested narrowing alone does not trigger lenity)
- Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (ex post facto/novel judicial enlargement principle)
- United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (presumption of regularity in prosecutorial decisions)