United States v. Gregory Welch
683 F.3d 1304
11th Cir.2012Background
- Broward County deputies, with probable cause to believe Jacobs robbed a store, searched Welch’s apartment complex without warrants in three units.
- Welch answered the door at Welch’s apartment; police conducted a protective sweep after entering with guns drawn and Welch was unarmed.
- Welch initially refused consent; after a deputy threatened to obtain a warrant and noted delay, Welch consented orally and in writing.
- Search yielded Welch’s pistol and ammunition in an attic space; Welch admitted the items were his.
- District court found the sweep unlawful but held Welch’s consent voluntary and not tainted; Welch pled guilty to felon-in-possession and challenged ACCA predicate status.
- The presentence report used three prior violent felonies to impose a 15-year minimum under the ACCA; only the 1996 Florida strong-arm robbery conviction is challenged on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether consent was voluntary and attenuated from illegality | Welch argues taint from unlawful entry; consent invalid if tainted. | Welch contends consent was voluntary despite initial unlawful sweep; attenuation applies. | Consent was voluntary and not tainted; attenuation doctrine applied. |
| Whether Welch’s Florida robbery conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA | Florida robbery via snatching may be sufficient for violent felony under residual clause. | If snatching was merely larceny at the time, it may not satisfy the violent felony definition. | Florida robbery, before and after sudden-snatching statute, qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662 (11th Cir. 2000) (consent taint depends on timing and circumstances of unlawful entry)
- United States v. Delancy, 502 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2007) (attenuation analysis for taint; lawful consent can remove taint from illegal entry)
- United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2011) (defines violent felony for ACCA and related standards)
- United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2009) (three-step residual clause analysis for serious risk of physical injury)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) ( Begay guiding purposes for residual clause similarity to enumerated crimes)
- United States v. Chitwood, 676 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2012) (refines Harrison/ Begay framework for residual clause analysis)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (interpretation of 'violent force' and causation in qualifying offenses)
- Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010) (defines 'physical force' for elements clause context)