United States v. Gregory McRae
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13077
5th Cir.2015Background
- After Hurricane Katrina, NOPD officer Daren Warren shot Henry Glover; Glover was placed in William Tanner’s car and later found dead in the backseat. NOPD Officer Gregory McRae moved the car and later set it on fire, destroying the car and Glover’s body.
- McRae was indicted on multiple counts including 18 U.S.C. § 242 (civil-rights violations), 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (destruction of a "tangible object" to obstruct an investigation), and 18 U.S.C. § 844(h) (use of fire to commit a felony).
- At trial McRae was convicted on all counts except one assault charge; the district court imposed an aggregate 207-month sentence. On appeal the Fifth Circuit vacated one conviction (access-to-courts count) but affirmed others and remanded for resentencing.
- On remand McRae sought a new trial based on (1) newly discovered evidence of a post‑traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) diagnosis and (2) anonymous, government‑lawyer postings on NOLA.com that he argued prejudiced the trial. The district court denied the motion and reimposed the sentence.
- After the district court’s decision the Supreme Court decided Yates v. United States, narrowing the scope of § 1519 to records‑like objects; both parties agreed § 1519 did not reach burning a car or corpse.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of a new trial, vacated McRae’s § 1519 conviction under plain‑error review in light of Yates, and remanded for resentencing on the remaining convictions.
Issues
| Issue | McRae’s Argument | United States’ Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether burning a car/corpse violated 18 U.S.C. § 1519 | McRae was convicted under § 1519 for burning Tanner’s car and Glover’s body to obstruct a federal investigation | § 1519’s "tangible object" covers conduct like McRae’s (but parties later agreed otherwise after Yates) | After Yates, § 1519 does not cover a car or corpse; conviction vacated under plain‑error review and remanded for resentencing |
| Whether new PTSD diagnosis warrants a new trial | PTSD diagnosis would negate mens rea for § 1519/§ 242 and likely produce acquittal | PTSD diagnosis discovered post‑trial is not shown to have existed at the time or to negate willfulness; trial testimony showed intentional conduct | Denied: evidence would not probably produce an acquittal; McRae waived any PTSD argument re § 242 and record shows willful intent |
| Whether anonymous DOJ attorney online comments require a new trial | Anonymous DOJ attorney posts created government‑induced prejudicial publicity warranting a new trial | The posts were anonymous, low‑profile, not by trial prosecutors, and no proof any juror saw them; no presumed prejudice | Denied: no actual prejudice shown and the anonymous, low‑profile nature means presumed prejudice does not attach |
| Whether remand is required after vacating one count | McRae sought relief following vacatur of § 1519 conviction | Government agreed vacatur appropriate; district court should resentence if needed | Remand for resentencing affirmed so district court can reassess the sentencing package under § 3553 factors |
Key Cases Cited
- Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (plurality holding § 1519’s "tangible object" limited to records‑like items)
- Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (presumption of prejudice from pretrial publicity applies only in extreme cases)
- Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (plain‑error review framework)
- Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (actual juror prejudice standard)
- United States v. Wilcox, 631 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2011) (online/local blog publicity did not warrant presumed prejudice)
- United States v. McRae, 702 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 2012) (prior appellate opinion concerning sufficiency and sentencing issues)