United States v. Gregory Mays, 683 F. App'x 427

In April–May 2014 Gregory Mays exchanged sexually explicit messages with an undercover officer posing as a 14‑year‑old on Craigslist, arranged a meeting, and was arrested in a parking lot.
Police took two cell phones and a condom from his vehicle during an inventory search, read Miranda warnings at arrest, and transported Mays to a “soft” interview room at the police station.
In the interview room detectives read Miranda warnings again, Mays signed a Miranda waiver, and then was presented with a written consent/search‑waiver for his two cell phones.
During signing Mays said, “I really should have a lawyer, huh?” Officers replied that he could have a lawyer if he asked; Mays did not insist and later said lawyers were a waste of money and signed the search waiver.
A search of the phones revealed images and videos of Mays engaged in sexual activity with a minor; he was charged under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2422(b). Mays moved to suppress the phone evidence and statements; the district court denied the motion and Mays entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the suppression issue.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity of consent to search phones (Fourth Amendment)	Mays could not read the search‑waiver form and therefore did not voluntarily consent	Police: Mays was advised, never said he couldn’t read the form, signed multiple times, and interview was noncoercive	Consent was voluntary; waiver valid and search lawful
Invocation of right to counsel (Fifth Amendment/Miranda)	Mays’s remark "I really should have a lawyer, huh?" was an unambiguous request for counsel; subsequent questioning violated Miranda	Police: statement was ambiguous/questioning permissibly continued after officers told him he could ask for a lawyer	Statement was ambiguous under Davis line; not an unequivocal invocation, so interrogation need not stop

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (voluntariness of consent to search judged under totality of circumstances)
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (government bears burden to prove consent to search)
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (warrantless searches are per se unreasonable except for established exceptions)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (custodial interrogation requires warnings and respects invoked rights)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (invocation of right to counsel must be unambiguous)
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (clarifies when statements constitute invocation of counsel)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (no different standards for invoking right to remain silent vs. right to counsel)
Riascos‑Suarez, 73 F.3d 616 (Sixth Circuit factors for assessing voluntariness of consent)
Franklin v. Bradshaw, 545 F.3d 409 (clarifies reasonable‑officer standard for perceiving invocation of counsel)
Amawi, 695 F.3d 457 (inquiring about an attorney’s presence is not an unambiguous invocation of right to counsel)