United States v. Gray
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3958
1st Cir.2015Background
- Nancy Gray, a long‑time American Airlines flight attendant, was indicted under 49 U.S.C. § 46507(1) for writing “Bomb on Board! BOS‑MIA” on an aircraft lavatory door; no bomb was found.
- Gray voluntarily met with FBI agents, signed a written confession admitting she wrote the message to "get the ground workers in trouble," and left without appearing impaired at the FBI office.
- At trial the government introduced the confession and witness testimony about Gray’s alleged motive; Gray did not testify and withdrew a pretrial motion to suppress her confession.
- The statute requires proof that the defendant gave false information “knowing the information to be false, willfully and maliciously or with reckless disregard for the safety of human life.”
- At charge conference, defense proposed defining “maliciously” as “evil purpose or motive” (per Sand’s); the court initially used that language but later instructed the jury that malice meant “evil purpose or improper motive.”
- The jury convicted Gray; on appeal she argued the jury instruction diluted the malice element and thus deprived her of a fair trial. The First Circuit vacated and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Gray’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper definition of “maliciously” in § 46507(1) | "Maliciously" should be defined as "evil purpose or motive" (per Sand’s) — a higher mens rea that requires improper, evil intent | Use common‑law definition (intentional or willful disregard); no separate evil‑motive requirement; court’s modified instruction was adequate | Court held "maliciously" should be defined as "evil purpose or motive" (Sand’s) because statutory scheme and legislative history indicate Congress intended a higher mens rea than mere intent |
| Whether adding the word “improper” to the jury charge diluted the mens rea | Instruction including only “evil purpose or motive” protects the defendant; adding “improper motive” lowers the standard and admits many benign reasons jurors might disapprove of | The words are similar enough; “improper” conveys deliberate wrongfulness and did not lower the burden | Court held the addition of “improper motive” impermissibly diluted malice and lowered the government’s burden of proof |
| Harmless‑error analysis | Erroneous instruction was prejudicial because evidence of malice was weak and ambiguous (confession and disputed witness statements) | The issue was waived or, if preserved, harmless because evidence supported malice | Court applied nonconstitutional harmless‑error standard and concluded the error was not harmless; conviction vacated and new trial ordered |
| Whether common‑law meaning controls or legislative history can displace it | Sand’s/legislative history of the Bomb Hoax Act supports an "evil purpose or motive" definition for § 46507(1) | Presume Congress adopted common‑law meaning absent clear contrary indication | Court concluded that legislative context and statutory scheme rebut the presumption and favored the "evil purpose or motive" construction |
Key Cases Cited
- Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (presumption that Congress uses common‑law terms to incorporate their common‑law meaning)
- United States v. Hassouneh, 199 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 1999) (interpreting analogous Bomb Hoax Act and endorsing “evil purpose or motive” definition)
- United States v. Sasso, 695 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2012) (framework for reviewing preserved jury‑instruction error and harmless‑error analysis)
- United States v. Tobin, 480 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that a “bad faith / improper motive” instruction risked sweeping in conduct jurors merely disapproved of)
- United States v. Grady, 746 F.3d 846 (7th Cir. 2014) (recognizing alternative common‑law definitions and upholding an instruction defining “maliciously” as intentional or with deliberate disregard)
- United States v. Serawop, 410 F.3d 656 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing common‑law malice as requiring lack of justification, excuse, or mitigation; cited in dissent)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (statutory use of common‑law terms presumed to incorporate settled common‑law meanings absent indication to the contrary)