United States v. Grant Cramer
962 F.3d 375
| 8th Cir. | 2020Background:
- Grant Cramer lived in the home of Sandra Clark and her 17‑year‑old daughter T.B.; Clark entrusted Cramer with household electronic devices to restrict T.B.’s sharing of sexual images.
- Investigators found multiple devices in Cramer’s locked room containing explicit photos and videos of T.B.; a tablet and thumb drive had videos of T.B. masturbating with an electric toothbrush; Skype messages and a handwritten note referencing names and prices were recovered.
- T.B. testified before a grand jury describing that Cramer directed and assisted her in producing explicit images and referred to being forced to perform “sexual things”; Cramer admitted setting up recordings but denied sexual contact.
- Cramer pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); the PSR recommended two two‑level enhancements: one for commission of a sexual act and one for distribution of child pornography under USSG § 2G2.1.
- At sentencing the district court adopted the PSR findings (relying on grand jury transcripts and investigator testimony), imposed the statutory maximum 120 months imprisonment and eight years supervised release with special conditions; Cramer appealed.
Issues:
| Issue | Cramer (Appellant) | Government / District Court | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court relied on an unproven fact (forced oral sex) to apply a §2G2.1(b)(2)(A) enhancement | Argues the record is too vague to prove a sexual act; the court erred procedurally | Defense failed to preserve objection; grand jury testimony and PSR supported the finding | Waived/forfeited; district court properly found facts and applied the enhancement |
| Whether the §2G2.1(b)(3) distribution enhancement was clearly erroneous | Contends evidence could show T.B. (not Cramer) distributed images; enhancement not proven | Evidence shows Cramer controlled devices, Skype messages, note, and moved images among devices | Enhancement affirmed; ample evidence Cramer knowingly distributed images |
| Whether the 120‑month sentence was substantively unreasonable | Argues district court improperly weighed §3553(a) factors and ignored low criminal history | Offense was an aggravated exploitation of a minor; court considered §3553(a) and had broad discretion | No abuse of discretion; sentence reasonable given offense conduct and statutory cap |
| Whether special supervised‑release conditions were an abuse of discretion | Argues conditions are boilerplate, overbroad, and not particularized | Conditions tied to offense, consistent with guidelines, and use approval requirements rather than outright bans | Conditions upheld as reasonably related to offense and offender; no abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Lindsey, 827 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2016) (district court may accept PSR facts not specifically objected to)
- United States v. Dokes, 872 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2017) (same principle on PSR fact acceptance)
- United States v. Thompson, 289 F.3d 524 (8th Cir. 2002) (plain‑error review applies when objection was inadvertent)
- United States v. Trevino, 829 F.3d 668 (8th Cir. 2016) (district court may adopt PSR facts to which defendant did not object)
- United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard of review for substantive reasonableness is abuse of discretion)
- United States v. Deatherage, 682 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 2012) (abuse‑of‑discretion review for special conditions of supervised release)
- United States v. Wilkins, 909 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2018) (conditions must relate to §3553(a) and Sentencing Commission policy)
- United States v. Koch, 625 F.3d 470 (8th Cir. 2010) (approval requirement for computer/internet use upheld)
- United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2009) (prior approval for observing children in public places upheld)
- United States v. Muhlenbruch, 682 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 2012) (restrictions on pornographic materials upheld)