United States v. Gonzalo Vasquez-Gonzalez, 901 F.3d 1060

Gonzalo Vasquez-Gonzalez, a lawful permanent resident brought to the U.S. as a child, was convicted in 1995 under California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) for assault with a deadly weapon (stabbing) and sentenced to four years.
He was placed in removal proceedings while imprisoned and removed to Mexico in 1999 as removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony based on that California conviction; he reentered the U.S. undocumented shortly after.
In 2014 he was charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 for illegal reentry; he moved to dismiss arguing his 1999 removal was invalid for two reasons: (1) his § 245(a)(1) conviction was not a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (§ 16(b) having been invalidated by Sessions v. Dimaya), and (2) the immigration judge failed to advise him he was eligible for discretionary relief under former INA § 212(c).
The district court denied the motion; Vasquez was convicted after a stipulated-facts bench trial and sentenced to 15 months.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed (a) whether the California § 245(a)(1) offense is categorically a crime of violence under § 16(a), and (b) whether Vasquez plausibly would have been granted § 212(c) relief such that the IJ’s failure to advise caused prejudice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1) (1993–2011) is a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)	Vasquez: § 245(a)(1) can be satisfied by negligent/unintentional conduct, so it does not categoricaly match § 16(a)’s intentional-use-of-force element	Government: California assault requires intent to commit a battery (intentional use of force); § 245(a)(1) therefore fits § 16(a)	Court: § 245(a)(1) requires intentional use of force and is categorically a crime of violence under § 16(a)
Whether IJ’s failure to advise Vasquez of apparent eligibility for § 212(c) relief prejudiced him and renders removal invalid	Vasquez: IJ failed to advise him of § 212(c) eligibility and it is plausible he would have received relief	Government: Even if not advised, Vasquez cannot show it was plausible he would have been granted relief given serious and recent criminal record	Court: Although IJ failed to advise, Vasquez cannot plausibly show he would have obtained § 212(c) relief (heightened equities required); no prejudice shown

Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (invalidated 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) as void for vagueness)
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (interpreting § 16(a) to require a higher degree of intent than negligence)
Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (applying categorical approach and holding § 16(a) requires intentional use of force)
United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2009) (held Cal. § 245(a)(1) categorically a crime of violence for federal purposes)
United States v. Heron-Salinas, 566 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2009) (addressed assault with a firearm under Cal. § 245 and § 16)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (established categorical approach for comparing state statutes to generic federal offenses)
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (discussed historical prevalence of § 212(c) grants; cited regarding availability of relief)