United States v. Gerard Smith
831 F.3d 1207
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Seven LASD members (Joint Appellants) and one deputy (Sexton) were convicted of conspiracy and obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1503) for actions that interfered with a federal grand jury investigation into alleged jail civil-rights abuses; two (Craig and Long) were also convicted of making false statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001).
- The FBI used an undercover operation that led to an inmate (Anthony Brown) receiving a contraband cell phone to communicate with investigators; LASD personnel seized the phone and thereafter restricted and moved Brown after learning of FBI involvement.
- LASD officers interviewed and pressured Brown and deputies (Michel, Courson) not to cooperate with the FBI; Brown was rebooked under aliases and moved, hindering the Marshals and FBI from producing him for grand jury testimony.
- Some LASD personnel surveilled and threatened FBI Agent Marx, causing the FBI to pause jail interviews for months; the evidence included recordings, documents, and witness testimony including admissions by some defendants.
- At trial the central factual dispute was mens rea: Government argued defendants acted "corruptly" to obstruct a grand jury investigation; defendants claimed they acted in good faith, under orders, or to protect Brown.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper intent formulation for §1503 — whether instruction permitted conviction for obstructing an FBI investigation rather than a grand jury | Government: jury should be instructed that §1503 requires intent to influence grand jury proceedings; FBI acts here were part of grand jury investigation | Defendants: instruction misstated intent element and allowed conviction for obstructing an independent FBI investigation | Court: instruction was correct; references to a "grand jury investigation" were proper, FBI acted as arm of grand jury on the record, no plain error |
| Dual-purposes instruction — whether unlawful purpose must be sole, primary, dominant, or merely "more than incidental" | Government: unlawful purpose need not be sole or primary; dual motives do not negate culpability | Defendants: unlawful purpose must be sole/primary or at least dominant; "more than merely incidental" is too vague | Court: rejected sole/primary requirement; dual purposes instruction permissible; cautioned against "merely incidental" and "dominant" wording but found no reversible error here |
| Good-faith / innocent-intent instructions — whether jury was properly told good faith could negate criminal intent and whether an additional innocent-intent instruction was required | Government: given instructions correctly framed good faith as negating mens rea; no separate innocent-intent instruction necessary | Defendants: good-faith instruction diluted defense; sought specific innocent-intent instruction tied to reasonable reliance on superior orders | Court: good-faith instruction properly conveyed that good faith about one purpose does not prove good faith as to all; refusal to give additional innocent-intent instruction was not an abuse of discretion |
| Instructions re: false-statement counts and California law — whether instructions improperly allowed conviction despite good faith or misstated state-law consequences | Government: false-statement counts required willfulness and materiality; California-law instruction did not prejudice verdict | Defendants: dual-purposes and good-faith instructions might have applied to §1001 counts; state-law instruction (authorizing contraband at FBI direction) was incorrect and prejudicial | Court: dual-purposes and good-faith instructions did not apply to false-statement counts; §1001 instructions required willfulness so good faith would preclude conviction; any error about California law was harmless given separate instruction that local officers had authority to investigate |
Key Cases Cited
- Aguilar v. United States, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (§1503 requires intent to influence grand jury proceedings; nexus between agency action and judicial proceeding required)
- United States v. Duran, 41 F.3d 540 (9th Cir. 1994) (grand jury investigation is a judicial proceeding under §1503)
- United States v. Macari, 453 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2006) (defendants may be held accountable for obstructing grand jury where agency actions are part of grand jury investigation)
- Triumph Capital Group, Inc. v. United States, 544 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussion of nexus/materiality concepts in obstruction contexts)
- United States v. Bonds, 784 F.3d 582 (9th Cir.) (characterizing the "natural and probable effect" element as materiality in §1503 cases)
- United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981) (definition of "corruptly" for obstruction statutes)
- United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2008) (dual-purpose instructions: unlawful purpose need not be sole but must be substantial)
- United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1988) (dual motives do not negate corrupt intent to obstruct)
- United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2009) (good-faith instruction discussion)
- United States v. Green, 745 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1984) (good-faith instruction principles)
- United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007) (presumption that jurors follow instructions; review of instructions as a whole)