United States v. Gene Sutton
962 F.3d 979
7th Cir.2020Background
- In 2008 Sutton pleaded guilty to distributing 124 grams of crack cocaine and to a § 924(c) firearm offense; the then-statutory minimum was 180 months (10 + 5 years consecutive, producing 15 years total).
- At sentencing the parties entered a plea/sentencing agreement calling for a 180‑month sentence; the district court accepted that agreement without resolving competing Guidelines disputes.
- The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the crack thresholds (potentially favorable to Sutton) but was not retroactive at first; the First Step Act § 404 (2018) later authorized courts to reduce sentences of covered offenses as if the Fair Sentencing Act had been in effect.
- Sutton filed a § 404(b) motion in 2019 seeking relief; the district court denied it, treating the government’s original agreement and Sutton’s withdrawal of objections as reasons to refuse a further reduction.
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit (a) addressed the narrow procedural question whether § 404 motions proceed under § 3582(c)(1)(B) or under the First Step Act itself, and (b) reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion.
- The Seventh Circuit held the First Step Act is its own procedural vehicle (though § 3582(c)(1)(B) is relevant to avoid implied repeal) and affirmed the district court’s discretionary denial given Sutton’s sentencing agreement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper procedural vehicle for a § 404 First Step Act motion | First Step Act is an independent procedural vehicle authorizing motions and relief | § 3582(c)(1)(B) provides the appropriate procedural vehicle (i.e., framework) for sentence modifications | First Step Act is its own vehicle; § 3582(c)(1)(B) is relevant only to the extent it removes a statutory obstacle and avoids implied repeal, not to supply or narrow § 404’s terms |
| Whether § 3582(c)(1)(B) limits the scope of relief under § 404 | Sutton: limits come from the First Step Act itself, not § 3582(c) | Government: § 3582(c)(1)(B)’s “to the extent … expressly permitted” language requires narrow construction of district-court discretion | Court refused to adopt a § 3582-driven cabining rule; any limits must be drawn from the First Step Act’s text and interpretation |
| Whether district court abused its discretion by denying Sutton’s § 404(b) motion | Sutton: the Fair Sentencing Act/FSA-based statutory minimum entitles him to reduction and release | Government: sentencing agreement already conferred benefit; Sutton bargained away objections and risk | No abuse of discretion; district court permissibly relied on the plea/sentencing agreement and denial was within statutory "may" discretion |
| Mootness/timeliness and scope of relief | Sutton: release does not moot appeal; seeks remand to reconsider imprisonment and supervised-release terms | Government: waived untimely-notice defense; § 404 may affect supervised release too | Appeal not moot; government waived the late-notice defense; remand could produce relief as to supervised release if warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (establishing temporal-retroactivity issue for the Fair Sentencing Act)
- United States v. Shaw, 957 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2020) (interpreting § 404 and interaction with § 3582(c))
- United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2019) (treating § 3582(c)(1)(B) as the vehicle in context and rejecting § 3582(c)(2) reliance)
- United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2019) (reading First Step Act relief narrowly vis-à-vis sentencing analysis)
- United States v. Allen, 956 F.3d 355 (6th Cir. 2020) (discussing the First Step Act framework and § 3582’s relevance)
- United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660 (2d Cir. 2020) (describing § 3582(c)(1)(B) as the correct framework while recognizing First Step Act’s independent terms)
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (discussing the binding effect of Sentencing Commission policy statements on § 3582(c)(2) relief)