United States v. GAUSE, 1:23-cr-00190

The FBI obtained four search warrants for "tower dump" records from major cell phone providers related to six robbery locations across specific dates and times in November 2020.
The warrants sought cell site information to identify devices present at the scene of each robbery, for discrete 20–35 minute intervals, not continuous monitoring.
The FBI agent affirmed that only phones identified at more than one robbery scene in these precise intervals would have information seized and analyzed.
Defendants moved to suppress the tower dump data, arguing the search was unconstitutional under Carpenter v. United States, claiming it was overly broad and generalized.
The search warrants were issued by a magistrate judge, based on affidavits outlining probable cause that evidence of the robberies would be found via the cell site data.
The court evaluated the sufficiency of the warrant applications and whether the warrants complied with Fourth Amendment requirements.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Mitchell et al.)	Defendant's Argument (Gov’t)	Held
Whether tower dump records are a search requiring a warrant under Fourth Amendment	Tower dumps are governed by Carpenter and are an unreasonable search without sufficient particularization	Tower dumps are distinct from Carpenter; warrants were obtained as a precaution	Court finds Carpenter does not extend to brief, targeted tower dumps; warrant sufficed
Sufficiency and particularity of the warrants	Warrants are overbroad and not particularized to any individual	Warrants specifically defined times, places, and scope, and limited seizure to relevant phones	Warrants were sufficiently particular and based on probable cause
Applicability of the "general warrant" prohibition	Warrants operated as general warrants, allowing broad rummaging	Tower dumps are narrow in scope, unlike geofence warrants; limited information sought	Court holds warrants were not general warrants
Need for suppression based on warrant validity	Suppression proper because of insufficient particularization and unjustified search	Suppression not warranted; warrants valid and officers acted in good faith	Suppression denied; warrants met Fourth Amendment standards

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no Fourth Amendment protection for records voluntarily disclosed to third parties)
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (pen register use not a Fourth Amendment search)
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (probable cause standard for warrants is a 'fair probability')
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (procedure for challenging warrants for false statements in affidavits)
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987) (warrant must describe particularity in what is to be searched/seized)
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (prolonged GPS tracking is a search under the Fourth Amendment)
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (search/seizure must be particularized to person searched)
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good faith exception to suppression for officers relying on warrants)