United States v. Gaspar-Miguel, 947 F.3d 632

Petrona Gaspar-Miguel was observed by a Border Patrol agent crossing from Mexico into the U.S. with a group by walking around a 15-foot fence; the agent radioed for assistance.
The agent continuously watched the group with binoculars from the moment of crossing until other agents apprehended them, but could not discern individual details.
Gaspar was charged and convicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) for illegal entry without inspection; she appealed arguing she never "entered" because she remained under official restraint (continuous surveillance) from entry until arrest.
The magistrate judge found her guilty; the district court affirmed, rejecting the argument that continuous surveillance alone constitutes official restraint sufficient to negate "entry."
The Tenth Circuit panel (Briscoe, J.) affirmed, holding that continuous surveillance, by itself, does not constitute official restraint for purposes of § 1325(a)(1).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Government)	Defendant's Argument (Gaspar)	Held
Whether continuous surveillance by Border Patrol prevents "entry" under § 1325(a)(1)	"Entry" occurred; surveillance does not negate physical crossing and thus supports conviction	Continuous surveillance is "official restraint" so she was never free and therefore did not "enter" within the meaning of the statute	Continuous surveillance alone does not constitute official restraint; conviction affirmed
Whether this panel must decide if "entry" generally requires freedom from official restraint	Government treats prior precedent as unsettled; focuses on facts here	Gaspar asks court to apply the freedom-from-restraint doctrine to negate entry	Court assumed arguendo that entry might require freedom from restraint but held surveillance alone is insufficient; declined to resolve broader doctrinal question

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (statutory terms with settled meanings are presumed imported absent contrary indication)
Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729 (2013) (same principle about settled statutory meanings)
United States v. Pacheco-Medina, 212 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2000) (discusses surveillance and official restraint)
United States v. Gonzalez-Torres, 309 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversed conviction where continuous surveillance meant no entry)
United States v. Ruiz-Lopez, 234 F.3d 445 (9th Cir. 2000) (surveillance and entry analysis)
United States v. Cruz-Escoto, 476 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting limits of surveillance-based restraint)
United States v. Vela-Robles, 397 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2005) (seismic sensor triggering not "surveillance" for restraint)
United States v. Hernandez-Herrera, 273 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2001) ("persistent tracking" is not official restraint)
United States v. Macias, 740 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2014) (official restraint can negate entry in some contexts)
Lopez v. Sessions, 851 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2017) (entry requires freedom from official restraint under § 1326 context)
United States v. Oscar, 496 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1974) (historical treatment of official restraint in entry cases)
United States v. Kavazanjian, 623 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980) (treats freedom from official restraint as component of entry)
United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1954) (early criminal recognition of official-restraint theory)