16 F.4th 92
4th Cir.2021Background
- In Mississippi, Gary Curbow was charged with shooting at military helicopters; the district court found him incompetent to stand trial and committed him to the Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) for evaluation and treatment.
- FMC Butner (a federal medical center in North Carolina) conducted evaluations; by June–July 2019 evaluators concluded Curbow was unlikely to be restored to competency and that he met § 4246’s definition of a dangerous person.
- FMC Butner’s warden signed a § 4246 certificate (July 17, 2019) and the U.S. Attorney filed it in the Eastern District of North Carolina (July 25, 2019), staying Curbow’s release and initiating civil-commitment proceedings.
- Curbow moved to dismiss the § 4246 filing as untimely, arguing (like the defendant in United States v. Wayda) that the Attorney General no longer had the required § 4241(d) custody when the certificate was filed.
- The North Carolina district court denied dismissal after finding the 49-day gap between the unrestorability finding and the § 4246 filing reasonable; after a hearing it committed Curbow under § 4246.
- On appeal Curbow preserved no objection in Mississippi to delays during prior § 4241(d) periods; he challenged timeliness, argued § 4246(a) eligibility is jurisdictional, and raised other procedural claims; the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Curbow) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of § 4246 certification based on the period after the unrestorability determination | The 49‑day period between the unrestorability determination and filing was unreasonable; certification thus untimely under Wayda | The 49‑day period was reasonable given evaluators’ report, warden review, and U.S. Attorney review; Wayda permits reasonable administrative delays | Held: Court’s factual finding that 49 days was reasonable is not clearly erroneous; denial of dismissal affirmed |
| Effect of delays in earlier § 4241(d) commitment periods (did earlier lapses terminate custody) | Earlier lapses in the first and second § 4241(d) periods ended Attorney General custody and rendered § 4246 inapplicable | Any such challenge should have been raised in Mississippi; Curbow waived the argument; delays were not shown to be unreasonable here | Held: Argument waived for failure to timely object in Mississippi; not decided on merits |
| Whether § 4246(a) eligibility is subject-matter jurisdictional | § 4246(a) eligibility is jurisdictional and therefore not waivable | Eligibility is non‑jurisdictional (an element) and may be waived | Held: § 4246(a) eligibility is not subject-matter jurisdictional and can be waived |
| Additional procedural challenges: proof of unavailability of state custody and adequacy of the district court’s explanation of dangerousness | Court should have required evidence and findings that no state custody was available; and should have given fuller reasons for commitment | Copley does not compel a different result here; issue not raised below and thus waived; any lack of explanation harmless because evidence of dangerousness was ample | Held: Both contentions forfeited/waived; no prejudice shown, commitment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Wayda, 966 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 2020) (held § 4248 certification must be filed within a reasonable time after an unrestorability determination; timeliness is measured from that key period)
- Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (Due Process prohibits indefinite confinement of an incompetent defendant; requires reasonable period to determine restorability or civil-commitment proceedings)
- United States v. Timms, 664 F.3d 436 (4th Cir. 2012) (courts and government should strive to minimize time an incompetent, unrestorable person waits for civil-commitment determination)
- United States v. Magassouba, 544 F.3d 387 (2d Cir. 2008) (§ 4241(d)(1) four‑month limit governs evaluative hospitalization; district courts retain authority to order additional § 4241(d)(2) confinement)
- United States v. Montalvo–Murillo, 495 U.S. 711 (1990) (statutory timing failures do not automatically nullify later proceedings; automatic release is not required as a remedy for timing violations)
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (distinguishes jurisdictional constraints from claim‑processing rules; clear congressional statement required to treat a limitation as jurisdictional)
- United States v. Joshua, 607 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2010) (distinguishes physical custody from legal custody in government detention contexts)
- United States v. Copley, 935 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1991) (addressed requirements to show unavailability of state custody in civil-commitment context)
- Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (defines waiver vs. forfeiture; waiver is intentional relinquishment of a known right)