28 F.4th 678
5th Cir.2022Background
- Kinte Garner Jr. pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
- His Presentence Investigation Report treated a prior Louisiana conviction for aggravated assault with a firearm (La. R.S. 14:37.4) as a "crime of violence," producing a base offense level of 20.
- Garner objected, citing this Court's decision in United States v. Young that pre-2012 La. R.S. 14:37.4 could be satisfied by negligent conduct and thus was not categorically a crime of violence.
- The Government and the district court relied on a 2012 amendment that changed the statutory phrasing from "discharge of a firearm" to "with a firearm," arguing that amendment removed any negligence-based liability.
- The district court overruled Garner’s objection, imposed a within-guidelines 42-month sentence, and Garner appealed.
- The Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the post-2012 La. R.S. 14:37.4 is categorically a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether La. R.S. 14:37.4 is a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines' force clause (use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force) | 2012 amendment removed the "discharge" element; statute now requires an intentional or purposeful assault "with a firearm," so negligence/recklessness no longer suffices | Louisiana general-intent framework allows reckless or negligent conduct to satisfy aggravated assault with a firearm; statute thus can be committed without the requisite deliberate targeting and so is not a force-clause crime of violence | Statute can still be violated by negligent or reckless conduct under Louisiana law; therefore not a categorical crime of violence under the force clause |
| Whether La. R.S. 14:37.4 is a "crime of violence" as the enumerated offense "aggravated assault" | (Implicit) The amended statute corresponds to generic aggravated assault | The statute’s general-intent structure permits negligence, sweeping beyond the generic meaning of aggravated assault (which requires purposeful, knowing, or reckless mens rea) | The statute encompasses conduct (mere negligence) outside the generic contemporary meaning of aggravated assault; not a crime of violence under the enumerated-offense clause |
Key Cases Cited
- Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (establishing that crimes punishable for reckless mens rea do not qualify under a force clause requiring force "against another")
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (holding that offenses committed with negligence do not meet a force-against-another standard)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (explaining the categorical approach focusing on statutory elements)
- United States v. Greer, 20 F.4th 1071 (5th Cir.) (applying Borden to exclude negligence- or recklessness-based offenses from the Guidelines' force clause)
- United States v. Young, [citation="809 F. App'x 203"] (5th Cir.) (holding pre-2012 La. R.S. 14:37.4 could be satisfied by negligent conduct)
- United States v. Torres-Jaime, 821 F.3d 577 (5th Cir.) (de novo review of Guidelines interpretation)
- United States v. Esparza-Perez, 681 F.3d 228 (5th Cir.) (describing how to determine the generic meaning of "aggravated assault")
- United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 788 F.3d 193 (5th Cir.) (discussing how Louisiana's general-intent regime can sweep more broadly than Model Penal Code definitions)
Vacated Garner’s sentence and remanded for resentencing consistent with the Court’s holding that La. R.S. 14:37.4 is not categorically a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).