953 F.3d 14
1st Cir.2020Background
- García began an eight-year term of federal supervised release in Nov. 2016 after an 87-month federal sentence for a drug conspiracy.
- Within months he was arrested twice: once for possession of multiple drugs at a housing project, and once for domestic-abuse-related conduct; Commonwealth prosecutors reclassified and reduced the original charges and García pled guilty to lesser offenses.
- Probation filed motions to revoke supervised release alleging possession of marijuana, cocaine, and pills with intent to distribute (P.R. CSA Art. 401) and domestic-abuse offenses under Puerto Rico Law 54; probation submitted sworn complaints, a girlfriend’s statement, García’s admissions to the probation officer’s motions, and police field-test results.
- At the revocation hearing the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that García’s actual conduct constituted (a) possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute (Art. 401, a "controlled substance offense" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)) and (b) violent domestic-abuse offenses, classifying the violations as Grade A under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1) and sentencing him to 36 months.
- On appeal García argued the court should have applied the categorical (and, if needed, modified categorical) approach tied to the record of conviction (Shepard documents) before considering other evidence; the government argued the revocation court could base the grade entirely on the supervisee’s actual conduct.
- The First Circuit affirmed, adopting a hybrid rule: use the categorical approach to identify whether the statute at issue defines a qualifying "crime of violence" or "controlled substance offense," but once a qualifying offense is identified the court may consider admissible evidence beyond Shepard documents to determine whether the supervisee actually committed that offense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 4B1.2's definitions in § 7B1.1(a)(1) require the categorical approach | García: § 4B1.2's "has as an element"/"prohibits" language mandates the categorical approach before grading a revocation | Government: The revocation grade depends on the supervisee's actual conduct; the categorical approach is inapplicable | Court: Apply categorical approach to identify whether a statutory offense qualifies under § 4B1.2, because the text refers to the statute's elements/prohibitions |
| Whether, after identifying a qualifying statutory offense, the revocation court may consider evidence beyond Shepard documents to decide if the defendant actually committed that offense | García: If government seeks to show which statutory variant the defendant committed via state-court records, it may only rely on Shepard-approved conviction records | Government: Once a qualifying offense is identified, the court may base grade solely on actual conduct and consider any admissible evidence | Court: Hybrid rule — after identifying a qualifying offense (categorically), the court may consider other admissible revocation evidence (including affidavits, field tests, reliable hearsay) to determine by a preponderance whether the supervisee's conduct constituted that offense |
| Whether Puerto Rico Art. 401 categorically qualifies as a "controlled substance offense" under § 4B1.2(b) | Government: Art. 401 should be treated as categorically a controlled-substance-trafficking offense | García: Art. 401 also criminalizes non-traffic acts (e.g., concealment), so it is overbroad | Court: Art. 401 is overbroad (per Dávila-Félix) but is divisible; the court can identify the discrete offense (possession with intent to distribute) and then assess whether García's conduct met its elements |
| Sufficiency of evidence that García possessed drugs with intent to distribute | García: The judge erred by relying on non-Shepard documents and the evidence was insufficient | Government: Probation complaints, García's admissions, and police field-test results showed distributive intent | Court: No reversible error — combined admissions and field-test/packaging evidence supported the preponderance finding of distributive intent; Grade A classification stands |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishing the categorical approach under ACCA)
- Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (distinguishing generic statutory offenses from particularized criminal acts)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (interpreting "has as an element" language to require looking to statutory elements)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (describing modified categorical approach and when courts may consult conviction records)
- Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (clarifying divisibility and the limits of modified categorical approach)
- Bell, 966 F.2d 703 (1st Cir.) (applying categorical approach to Guidelines' "crime of violence")
- Dávila-Félix, 667 F.3d 47 (1st Cir.) (holding P.R. Art. 401 overbroad for categorical classification)
- Martínez-Benítez, 914 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (refusing to assume a reclassified charge necessarily reflects a specific predicate offense without Shepard records)
- Willis, 795 F.3d 986 (9th Cir.) (adopting hybrid approach in revocation context)
- Carter, 730 F.3d 187 (3d Cir.) (similar hybrid reasoning: identify statutory offense then consider conduct)
- Bueno-Beltrán, 857 F.3d 65 (1st Cir.) (field-test results and corroborated statements can support revocation findings)