United States v. Fuller
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24443
| 2d Cir. | 2010Background
- Fuller was convicted in Missouri (2004) of statutory sodomy in the second degree and later registered as a sex offender under Missouri law.
- He moved to New York and, in 2007, US Marshals arrested him for failing to register or update his SORNA registration obligations.
- SORNA was enacted on July 27, 2006; the Attorney General issued an Interim Rule February 28, 2007 addressing pre-enactment convictions.
- Fuller argued SORNA did not apply to him until after the Interim Rule and that applying it retroactively would violate Ex Post Facto and other constitutional limits.
- The district court denied dismissal and Fuller pled guilty under a conditional plea, preserving appellate challenges, including the statutory interpretation and intent questions.
- The Second Circuit held that SORNA applied to Fuller upon enactment, that the offense does not require specific intent, and that Fuller’s conviction was proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does SORNA apply to pre-enactment offenders? | Fuller: §16913(d) grants AG sole discretion to apply SORNA to pre-enactment offenders. | Fuller argues SORNA applies only after Interim Ruling; retroactivity concerns arise. | SORNA applied upon enactment to pre-enactment offenders. |
| Does §16913(d) delegation raise non-delegation concerns? | AG could determine retroactive applicability without clear intelligible principle. | Delegation is limited and guided by statute’s structure and purpose. | No unconstitutional delegation; statute provides adequate guidance; interpretation favors applicability upon enactment. |
| Does SORNA require specific intent to violate the registration requirements? | Fuller: need explicit specific intent; jury instruction should require it. | Knowingly standard is general intent; no need for specific intent. | SORNA is a general intent crime; specific intent not required. |
| Does applying SORNA to Fuller violate Ex Post Facto or other constitutional limits? | Retroactive application could be punitive if not properly authorized. | Enactment date governs; no Ex Post Facto issue when travel and registration occurred post-enactment. | No Ex Post Facto violation; application proper at enactment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010) (addresses pre-SORNA travel and post-enactment liability under 2250)
- United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010) (limits of AG's §16913(d) delegation)
- United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926 (10th Cir. 2008) (delegation and constitutional avoidance considerations)
- United States v. DiTomasso, 621 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2010) (statutory interpretation of retroactivity and applicability)
- United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2009) (policy framework guiding delegation under §16913(d))
- United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) (context for delegated authority in criminal statutes)