United States v. Freeman
735 F.3d 92
| 2d Cir. | 2013Background
- At ~1:40 a.m. in the Bronx, an anonymous caller phoned 911 twice reporting a Hispanic/Black male wearing a black hat/white shirt (later described with du-rag/white du-rag) had a gun near a Chase Bank; caller refused to identify herself and could not be re-contacted.
- Police dispatch notified officers that a person was possibly armed; officers responded within minutes and heard over the radio that the caller said the suspect was walking/standing on a corner.
- Officers in an unmarked car located Joseph Freeman walking in the described area; they drove past, stopped, and confronted him on foot.
- Officer Conroy touched Freeman’s elbow; Freeman did not stop and shrugged off the touch; Officer Walsh then grabbed Freeman around the waist (a "bear hug"), after which Freeman was tripped, subdued, handcuffed, and a gun was recovered from his waistband.
- Freeman moved to suppress the gun, arguing the stop lacked reasonable suspicion because it rested primarily on the anonymous 911 calls; the district court denied suppression, Freeman stipulated to facts at a bench trial and was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- The Second Circuit reversed, holding the officers lacked reasonable suspicion at the seizure’s inception and vacated the conviction; a dissent would have found the 911 calls sufficiently reliable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Freeman) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When did the seizure occur? | Freeman: seizure occurred when Walsh grabbed him around the waist. | Gov't: seizure did not occur until handcuffs were applied (so later events could justify stop). | Court: seizure occurred at the "bear hug"; events after that cannot retroactively justify the stop. |
| Whether anonymous 911 calls provided reasonable suspicion to stop | Freeman: anonymous tip lacked indicia of reliability under J.L.; caller unknown, no predictive info of concealed criminality. | Gov't: calls were recorded, caller called twice, provided detailed and changing location/description so were reliable. | Court: calls remained anonymous for J.L. purposes; recording/number alone did not supply reliability; insufficient to justify stop. |
| Whether corroborating/contextual facts supplied reasonable suspicion | Freeman: corroborating facts (night, high-crime area, refusal to stop) are generic and do not transform an unreliable tip into reasonable suspicion. | Gov't: time, location, Freeman’s continued walking after being touched, and being the only person matching description supported suspicion. | Court: those factors were too weak or non-individualized; refusal to comply does not create reasonable suspicion when none existed before. |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (establishes stop-and-frisk reasonable-suspicion standard)
- Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (anonymous tip describing gun insufficient without indicia of reliability)
- Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (anonymous tip may support stop when corroborated)
- California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (flight after command affects when seizure occurs)
- United States v. Simmons, 560 F.3d 98 (2d Cir.) (limited exception: anonymous 911 call reporting ongoing emergency may carry greater reliability)
- Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (mixed questions of law and fact reviewed de novo)
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (totality-of-circumstances test for reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (reasonable suspicion must be particularized and objective)