United States v. Frankie Doctor, Sr.
958 F.3d 226
4th Cir.2020Background
- Frankie Lane Doctor, Sr. began supervised release in Feb. 2018 after his sentence was reduced under Johnson; probation reported an arrest for second-degree assault and battery (July 18, 2018), positive cocaine test, and failure to notify probation.
- Revocation hearing: victim Tony Pearson testified Defendant and his son Chris ("Furby") beat him at a house; Pearson described being punched, receiving stitches, eye swelling, and ongoing symptoms. Investigator Torres and a bystander (Pop) corroborated parts of Pearson’s account.
- Defense witnesses (including Furby, Defendant’s sister and girlfriend) largely said they did not see Defendant strike Pearson; Furby admitted impairment from drugs/alcohol and faulty memory.
- District court credited Pearson’s testimony, found by a preponderance that Doctor punched Pearson, adopted the violation report identifying South Carolina second-degree assault and battery, and treated the conduct as a Grade A violation (crime of violence) based on the defendant’s actual conduct.
- Court sentenced Doctor to 12 months and 1 day (statutory cap 24 months) and 12 months supervised release; Doctor appealed, arguing (1) insufficient proof/insufficient injury for second-degree assault, (2) court failed to announce the specific offense, and (3) court used conduct-specific rather than categorical approach to deem the offense a crime of violence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Doctor) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of proof that Doctor participated in assault | Victim unreliable; other witnesses did not see Defendant strike; injuries insufficient for 2nd-degree assault | Victim, investigator, and Pop provided consistent accounts; medical records show significant injuries | Court credited victim; no clear error — conviction by preponderance affirmed |
| Whether injuries met South Carolina 2nd-degree assault & battery elements | Injuries not "moderate"; at most lesser assault | Statute covers where "moderate bodily injury could have resulted"; evidence (stitches, swollen eye, loss of vision sensitivity) suffices | Court reasonably found the conduct could have resulted in moderate injury; upheld offense classification |
| Whether district court failed to announce the specific offense | Failure to state the offense (like Carter) prevents appellate review | Court adopted the violation report (which named 2nd-degree assault); adoption suffices for review | No plain error — adoption of report made the offense clear and did not prejudice Doctor |
| Whether court should have used categorical approach to decide "crime of violence" | Statute is overbroad (includes nonconsensual touching); categorical approach would show not a crime of violence, so only Grade B | Court used actual-conduct approach; alternatively modified categorical would apply and still show violent subsection | Although court erred in approach, any error was harmless: court would have given same 12 months + 1 day and sentence is reasonable under §3553(a); affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for supervised-release revocation and factual findings)
- United States v. Simmons, 917 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2019) (applying categorical approach to determine "crime of violence")
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (divisibility and the modified categorical approach)
- United States v. McDonald, 850 F.3d 640 (4th Cir. 2017) (harmlessness inquiry for Guidelines errors and appellate review of sentencing intent)
- Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (plain-error review framework)
- United States v. Salmons, 873 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding some nonconsensual-touching offenses fall outside Guidelines "force" definition)
- United States v. Bolden, 325 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (court may adopt PSR findings if it makes clear which disputes it resolves)
- United States v. Carter, 730 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2013) (failure to identify specific offense at revocation can impede appellate review)