United States v. Frank Richardson, 906 F.3d 417

Background

Frank Richardson planned and surveilled a series of electronics-store robberies in Detroit (Feb–May 2010); co-robbers used firearms while Richardson acted as lookout and did not enter stores.
A jury convicted Richardson of five Hobbs Act robbery counts (aiding and abetting), five 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) counts (aiding and abetting use of a firearm during a crime of violence), and one § 922(g) felon-in-possession count; district court sentenced him to 1,494 months.
On first appeal this court affirmed. While that appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States (invalidating ACCA’s residual clause), prompting Richardson to seek certiorari arguing Johnson cast doubt on § 924(c)’s residual clause.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated this court’s judgment, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Johnson; this court issued a limited remand vacating the sentence and directing the district court to reconsider Richardson’s sentence in light of Johnson.
On remand the district court reinstated the original sentence; Richardson appealed, raising (1) constitutional vagueness of § 924(c)’s residual clause, (2) various sentencing and procedural errors, and (3) denial/limitation of allocution.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed: it treated the remand as limited to Johnson-related issues, upheld Richardson’s § 924(c) conviction under the force clause, declined to address forfeited/non‑remand issues, and found the resentencing procedurally and substantively reasonable.

Issues

Issue	Richardson's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the remand from the Sixth Circuit was general or limited	Remand was general and permitted relitigation of trial/indictment/sentencing errors	Remand was limited to Johnson‑related sentencing issues	Remand was limited to Johnson‑based challenges; district court bound by that scope
Whether § 924(c)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson/Dimaya	§ 924(c)’s residual clause is similar enough to ACCA/§16(b) that Johnson/Dimaya render it void for vagueness	Even if residual clause is suspect, conviction can be sustained under § 924(c)’s independent force clause	Court did not decide residual‑clause validity; affirmed conviction under the force clause
Whether aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) (force clause)	Aiding and abetting is distinct from principal offense and thus may not satisfy the force clause	Aider/abettor is treated as a principal under § 2; Hobbs Act robbery is a divisible statute and robbery is a crime of violence	Aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery satisfies the force clause; § 924(c) conviction affirmed
Whether the resentencing was procedurally/substantively unreasonable (including failure to consider Pepper, Dean, base‑level objections, and allocution)	District court failed to articulate reasons, ignored sentencing arguments and post‑sentencing rehabilitation, misapplied Dean, and curtailed allocution	Remand was limited so district court properly declined to consider non‑Johnson issues; court considered Johnson arguments and acted within discretion	Sentence reinstated; district court did not err—non‑Johnson arguments were foreclosed by limited remand or forfeited; allocution was not required at resentencing and was not unfairly denied

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause held unconstitutionally vague)
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (§ 16(b) residual clause held vague; discusses need for material clarity compared to ACCA)
Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017) (district courts may consider the length of a mandatory § 924(c) sentence when sentencing predicate offenses)
United States v. Gooch, 850 F.3d 285 (6th Cir. 2017) (Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s force clause)
United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2016) (upheld § 924(c) residual clause as narrower than ACCA residual clause)
United States v. Patterson, 878 F.3d 215 (6th Cir. 2017) (limitations of limited remand; issues ripe on initial appeal cannot be reopened)
United States v. Richardson, 793 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2015) (earlier opinion affirming conviction and sentence)