69 F. Supp. 3d 374
S.D.N.Y.2014Background
- Defendants Rui Yang, Feng Ling Liu, and Vanessa Bandrich were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit immigration fraud after a multi-week trial involving ~1,800 fraudulent asylum applications.
- During trial several jurors, including Juror 2 and Juror 10, posted about their jury service on Twitter; Juror 10 was dismissed mid-trial after tweets that suggested potential bias.
- After Juror 10’s dismissal the court questioned remaining jurors about communications; Juror 2 denied discussing the case with other jurors or following the case online but acknowledged making non‑substantive comments (e.g., wishing the trial would end).
- Months later defendants moved under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 for a new trial, arguing Juror 2 lied during questioning, disobeyed the court’s instruction not to tweet, and exhibited bias revealed by her tweets.
- The court reviewed Juror 2’s tweets (which complained about trial length, noted interest as a crime‑writer, and post‑verdict summarized aspects of the case) and concluded the tweets did not discuss the substance of evidence or show dishonesty, bias, or prejudice to defendants.
- Rule 33 motion denied; court found no McDonough violation, no actual or inferable bias, and no resulting prejudice warranting a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a juror’s social‑media posts and her answers to post‑dismissal questioning warrant a new trial under McDonough | Jurors (Defendants) argued Juror 2 lied when denying social‑media communications and would have been removed for cause if truthful | Court found Juror 2’s answers were not dishonest: she denied substantive discussion with jurors or following the case online and admitted only non‑substantive complaints | Denied — McDonough’s two‑part test not met (no dishonest answer material to impartiality) |
| Whether Juror 2 violated the court’s instruction not to tweet about the trial | Defendants: tweets violated the explicit instruction and paralleled conduct of dismissed Juror 10, so removal would have been appropriate | Court: instruction prohibited discussing facts/substance; Juror 2’s tweets were non‑substantive and she understood the limitation | Denied — tweets did not contravene the instruction’s substance prohibition and did not show misconduct warranting relief |
| Whether Juror 2’s tweets reveal actual or inferable bias requiring a new trial | Defendants: expressions of interest in talking with prosecutors/FBI and using material for writing show bias against defendants | Court: juror’s status as a crime writer plausibly explains interest; mere desire to speak to party‑aligned officials does not prove bias | Denied — no actual, implied, or inferable bias shown |
| Whether any juror misconduct caused prejudice requiring relief under Rule 33 | Defendants: cumulative effect of dishonesty, instruction violation, and bias prejudiced their Sixth Amendment right | Court: absent bias or prejudice, post‑verdict probing disfavored and relief unwarranted | Denied — no prejudice; finality and jury deliberation interests weigh against a new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (two‑part test for post‑verdict juror misstatements on voir dire)
- United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125 (2d Cir.) (social media juror posts can threaten impartiality; caution and vigilance required)
- Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (post‑verdict juror scrutiny disfavored to protect deliberation integrity)
- United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158 (2d Cir.) (grounds for juror dismissal: actual, implied, or inferable bias)
- United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288 (3d Cir.) (observations on prevalence of juror social media use and need for judicial vigilance)